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ARTICLES
JUSTICE SCALIA AS A
MODERN LORD DEVLIN:
ANIMUS AND CIVIL BURDENS
IN ROMER V. EVANS
S.I. STRONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the legal world was captivated by
an ongoing debate between two of England's most respected jurists regard-
ing whether and to what extent morality should be reflected in the law.
The debate was instigated by the publication of the Wolfenden Report, a
study presented to Parliament as it considered whether to repeal certain
antisodomy laws in Great Britain.' Lord Patrick Devlin, then a Lord of
Appeal in Ordinary and later elevated to the House of Lords, Britain's
highest court, opposed the conclusions contained in the Wolfenden Report
* J.D., 1994, Duke University School of Law; M.P.W., 1990, University of Southern Cali-
fornia; B.A., 1986, University of California, Davis. The author, who is qualified as an attorney in
New York and as a solicitor in England and Wales, is currently associated with Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in New York. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful feedback provided by
Mark Vasco during the early stages of this Article.
1. The report, which was presented to Parliament in 1957 and published in 1959, was a prod-
uct of Parliament's Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution. See H.L.A. HART, LAXv,
LIBERTY AND MORALrrY 13 (1963). The report recommended that homosexual practices between
consenting adults be decriminalized, basing its recommendation on the ground that even if such prac-
tices were held by society to be immoral, they were beyond the proper scope of the law. See id. at 13-
15. See also Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review Essay of Making Men Moral, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 673 (1996) (book review) (discussing the Wolfenden Report and the Hart-
Devlin debate).
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and supported the continuation of the antisodomy laws.2 H.L.A. Hart, then
Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, believed that the use of
the criminal law to enforce popular morality, in particular sexual morality,
was inappropriate.3 The two men led the public discussion in England and
abroad for many years about the proper scope of the criminal law vis-h-vis
the legal enforcement of morality.4
The controversy has come full circle with the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent decision in Romer v. Evans.5 In Romer, six Justices agreed that
Colorado could not create a special class of citizens, that is, homosexuals,
and "prohibit[ ] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
state or local government designed to protect the named class." 6  Three
Justices, however, would have upheld the constitutionality of the provi-
sion, relying, in part, on the justifications proposed by Devlin over thirty
years ago.
The purpose of this Article is to review the dissent in Romer v. Evans
in the context of the continuing Hart-Devlin debate regarding the proper
role of morality in law and analyze the legitimacy of Justice Scalia's ar-
2. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS vi-vii (1965). See also Bradley, su-
pra note 1, at 673-74 (discussing Devlin's position). Many of the arguments made by Devlin were
made 100 years earlier by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, an eminent judge of the Victorian period and
an opponent of John Stuart Mill's utilitarian approach to law. See HART, supra note 1, at 16.
3. See HART, supra note 1, passim.
4. The debate continues into the present day, often invoking the names of the principals them-
selves. See, e.g., SIMON LEE, LAW AND MORALS (1986); BASIL MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY, AND
REUGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (1967); Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479,
487-88 (1989) [hereinafter Dworkin, Community] (attacking Devlin's premise that societies rely on
moral outrage to survive); Stephen G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND.
L.J. 331, 345 n.67 (1995) (discussing Hart and Devlin in the context of a larger discussion on the
proper role of morality in law); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIz. L. REV.
73 passim (1995) (discussing modem applications of Hart-Devlin debate); Robin West, Progressive
and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 659-61 (1990) (discussing Devlin's posi-
tion in conservative theory regarding the importance of traditional morality in law); Candace Groot
Hill, Note, Public Employees and Private Conduct: Cohabitation and the Vagueness of "Immorality,"
23 J. FAM. L. 11 passim (1984/85) (discussing civil enforcement of popular morality); Bradley, su-
pra note 1, at 673-77 (noting Robert George's revision of the conservative position enunciated by
Devlin); Harlon L. Dalton, "Disgust" and Punishment, 96 YALE L.J. 881, 905-09 (1987) (book re-
view) (reviewing Hart's and Devlin's arguments on "disgust" as a necessary predicate to enforcing
morality).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The majority opinion is discussed in Part II of this Article. Inter-
estingly, in 1963, Professor Louis Henkin stated that Devlin's theory regarding morality legislation
might one day be adopted by certain justices on the Supreme Court, who would subsequently find that
the Constitution did not stand in their way. See Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin
of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391,414 (1963). In many ways, that prophecy has now come true.
6. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
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guments in favor of the enactment of morality legislation.7 Although the
law at issue in Romer will be used as a primary example of morality legis-
lation, this Article will explore the legitimacy of such laws in other con-
texts as well.
The Romer dissent, which was authored by Justice Scalia and joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, relies heavily on Devlin's
argument that popular morality not only could, but should, form the basis
7. Because the term "morality legislation" will be used throughout this Article, it is perhaps
best to attempt a definition at this early stage. Morality laws, as used herein, consist of those laws that
are specifically aimed at curing "immoral" behavior that violates a social norm or taboo. Virtually all
such laws reflect a majority morality, since minorities are often unable to gamer sufficient electoral
support to impose their moral framework on others. See Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and
Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 303
n.11 (1984). The laws may operate within a larger moral framework, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 354 n.29 (1988) (discussing the "seamless
web" theory of morality), but their immediate goal is to limit certain behaviors rather than require the
adoption of positive moral virtues. This negative, "thou shalt not" quality of morality legislation is
due, in large part, to the law's preference for barring undesirable behaviors rather than setting forth
affirmative duties. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (rev. ed. 1969).
Many persons who oppose morality legislation have as their actual or presumed goal the crea-
tion of a morally neutral society. This approach is often challenged by those who believe that neu-
trality is impossible and that pro-neutrality theorists are doing nothing more than imposing their own
values on others. See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 313-16
(1990) (discussing the impossibility of true neutrality in law). In one sense, such claims are correct; in
matters of morality, there is no such thing as an "anti-value" that can "hold the spot" of a missing
value without influencing that empty space in some way. See id. However, advocates for neutrality in
law argue that the morality that is imposed in a less restrictive society (that is, one that severely limits
the number and types of morality laws enacted) is one that encourages and advances individual choice
as the primary goal of society, rather than the creation of a conformist society. See id. at 311-12.
Nevertheless, proponents of morality legislation point to the fact that morality has always had a strong
influence on law, and vice versa, in order to justify their position. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 598 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism).
This type of argument can be confusing, for once it is agreed that every law advances some vi-
sion of morality to some extent, virtually any law could be described as "morality legislation." There-
fore, to again clarify this discussion, the term "morality legislation" is used here to refer to a narrow
category of laws regulating conduct that not only violates established social norms, but poses no con-
crete or tangible harm to persons other than the actor, and possibly not even to the actor. See Henkin,
supra note 5, at 407. See also FEINBERG, supra, at xix-xx (discussing categories of "liberty-limiting
principles" or morality legislation); Michaelson, supra, at 303 n.l 1. The most commonly mentioned
morality laws include prohibitions and burdens on homosexuality, abortion, suicide, euthanasia, and
sexual expression (including pornography and prostitution). While I am not necessarily prepared to
defend all such acts to their logical extremes (since there may be times when such acts begin to affect
and harm others), I believe, for reasons that will be discussed infra, that laws concerning these acts are
illegitimate to the extent that they are enacted to protect morality or morals rather than to avoid harm
to others. See FULLER, supra, at 29 n.24 ("'All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other
than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their
own when a certain point is reached."') (quoting Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349, 355 (1908)).
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of both criminal and civil law. This theory is firmly embedded in the con-
servative legal tradition embraced by Scalia,8 but is radical in its express
adoption of "animus" or "moral disapproval" as an appropriate basis for
law.9 Scalia's dissent, which is discussed in Part III, focuses on two argu-
ments, each of which will be examined in light of existing commentary,
including that of Hart and Devlin, in Part IV. First, after presupposing that
morality legislation is not only proper but effective, Scalia expressly ap-
proves of animus against a certain group or class of persons as a basis for
civil and criminal legislation, thus raising the issue of whether animus -or
hostility toward a certain group can be considered an appropriate basis for
law. Second, he argues that if an act can be made a crime, it can also be
burdened at civil law, which leads to the question of whether and to what
extent the civil and criminal law are interchangeable in the area of morality
legislation.
Although the primary purpose of this Article is to review the Romer
dissent in light of existing jurisprudence, some suggestions as to alterna-
tive justifications for morality-type legislation are included in the conclud-
ing remarks in Part V.
II. THE ROMER MAJORITY
The six Justices who constituted the majority in Romer based their
decision to overturn the Colorado enactment on an equal protection ra-
tionale, finding that, contrary to the state's argument that the law in ques-
tion "puts gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons," the
provision actually created a special class of citizens and discriminated
against them unlawfully, 10 The state had argued that "the measure does no
8. See West, supra note 4, at 652-63 (discussing conservative theory and jurisprudence).
9. Robin West has argued that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was the first Su-
preme Court case to adopt "an explicitly conservative jurisprudential account of the 'natural' right of
the community to define and enforce the good in law." West, supra note 4, at 663. The Romer dis-
sent, however, has extended the Bowers reliance on popular morality to a new level by permitting
mere hostility to provide a basis for law. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623-25. The provision at issue took the form of an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution that is commonly known as "Amendment 2." The text of the amendment reads
as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, politi-
cal subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute,
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (overturned by Romer).
[Vol. 7 1:1
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more than deny homosexuals special rights,"" an argument which Scalia
later supported. However, the majority found that "[t]he amendment with-
draws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these
laws and policies."' 2 The majority found that Amendment 2 not only de-
nied gays and lesbians the protection of specific antidiscrimination laws
enacted for their benefit (of which there had been several), 13 but could also
deny them the protection of general antidiscrimination laws.14 Rather than
putting homosexuals on the same footing as other groups, the majority
found that Amendment 2 "impose[d] a special disability upon those per-
sons alone,"'15 which not only affected current rights but the ability of ho-
mosexual rights advocates to reap any political gains in the future. 16 The
protections that were denied to gays and lesbians were not considered by
the majority to be "special" in any way; indeed, they were "taken for
granted by most people either because they already had them or did not
need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in
a free society."' 7
11. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
12. Id. at 1625.
13. See id. at 1624 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(VII) (1994); ASPEN, COLO.
MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977); BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE § 12-1-1 (1987); DENVER, COLO. REV.
MUN. CODE, art. IV, § 28-92 (1991); Exec. Order No. D0035 (Dec. 10, 1990)).
14. See Romer, 116 S. CL at 1626. These general provisions forbade "arbitrary and capricious"
or "unfair" discrimination. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988) (using "arbitrary or ca-
pricious" standard); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-405 (1986) (using "arbitrary and capricious" standard);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(1)(f) (1994) (using "unfair" standard); 4 COLO. CODE RErs. § 801-1,
Policy 11-1 (1993) (prohibiting discrimination in employment context based on any "other non-merit
factor").
15. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
16. One of Scalia's main arguments was that the denial of a right at the state level merely made
overturning the law more difficult, an event which may be unfortunate for the disadvantaged group,
but which is perfectly legitimate in a democracy. See id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But f
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433 (S.D. Ohio
1994) ("To single out a group of citizens and place upon them the added and virtually insurmountable
burden in their pursuit of protection from majority discrimination thoroughly undermines the spirit of
our constitution.... [A] state may not single out and disadvantage any independently identifiable
group by making it more difficult for that group to enact legislation in its behalf; and so doing does
not 'demonstrate [a] devotion to democracy,' but rather makes a mockery of it." (citations omitted)),
rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). See also id. at 443 ("[W]e can
conceive of no legitimate governmental purpose rationally related to a law which prohibits a minority
group from ever obtaining anti-discrimination legislation on its behalf, unless it undertakes the mas-
sive and unmitigated-and likely insurmountable-burden of amending the city charter.... The pur-
pose not only to permit discrimination, but also to encourage it, is inherent in the very concept of such
a law. As such it is constitutionally defective.").
17. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
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The majority did not reach the question of whether to classify homo-
sexuals as a suspect class or whether discrimination against them violated
any fundamental rights. In making its decision, the majority relied on the
least stringent equal protection analysis, that is, the rational relation test,
stating that even under that most deferential standard, Amendment 2 failed
to pass constitutional muster.1
8
The majority noted that in a democracy a single named group may be
burdened if it is necessary in order to further a legitimate government in-
terest. 19 However, the majority also found that the Constitution requires
some sort of nexus between the classification of burdened individuals and
the legislative end in order to avoid classifications being drawn for the sole
purpose of disadvantaging the named group.20
The most important aspect of the majority decision, both in terms of
the dissent's conclusions and this Article, is the majority's statement that
mere animus cannot constitute a legitimate purpose for disfavoring certain
groups. 21 In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, stating, "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that
a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest. 22
18. See id. The dissent interpreted the majority's use of the rational relation test as a sign that
homosexuality should not be protected in the same way as race or religion. See id. at 1629, 1631 &
n.l (Scalia, J., dissenting). There is nothing in the majority opinion, however, to justify that conclu-
sion; instead, the majority's actions represent classic constitutional procedure, namely, to avoid
reaching issues that are not central to the case at bar.
19. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
20. See id. at 1627-28 (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of
the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.")). Because laws based on mere animosity have as
their primary intent an adverse impact on the named class, they are suspect under Fritz and now, ap-
parently, Romer. See also Gey, supra note 4, at 401-02 (suggesting a method by which courts could
evaluate and strike laws based on mere moral disapproval).
21. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (citing Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
22. Id. (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). Moreno also cited with apparent approval the dis-
trict court's rejection of the government's contention that "the challenged classification might be jus-
tified as a means to foster 'morality.' In rejecting that contention, the District Court noted that
'interpreting the amendment as an attempt to regulate morality would raise serious constitutional
questions."' Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535 n.7 (citation omitted). By the time Moreno reached the Su-
preme Court, the government had dropped its morality argument. See id. Interestingly, Scalia made
much of the Romer majority's failure to cite Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), see Romer,
116 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting), yet himself failed to distinguish Moreno and that line of
cases.
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The majority acknowledged the state's enunciated rationale for
Amendment 2, namely "respect for other citizens' freedom of association,
and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal
or religious objections to homosexuality,, 23 but found that these purposes
were neither legitimate nor discrete. Instead, Amendment 2 was held to
constitute a "status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it
is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit.
' 24
I. THE ROMER DISSENT
Justice Scalia, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Tho-
mas, supported the constitutionality of Amendment 2 as "a modest attempt
by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores
through use of the laws."25  The dissent claimed that "Coloradans
are... entitled to be hostile toward homosexual conduct" and that it is per-
fectly legitimate to burden homosexuals in order to "prevent piecemeal
deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Colo-
radans." 26 According to Scalia, the methods adopted by Amendment 2
were appropriate means by which the majority could combat advocates for
homosexual rights who "devote this political power to achieving not
merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homo-
sexuality. 27 In addition, Scalia opposed the proposition that homosexual-
23. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. The state also claimed the need to conserve its resources to fight
discrimination against other groups. See id. It is unclear how the state justified discrimination against
one group as the price that had to be paid in order to stop discrimination against another unrelated
group.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Throughout his dissent, Scalia argued that homosexuals
could not be considered "politically disfavored" due to their "geographic concentration
and ... disproportionate political power." Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His claim that he is un-
critical of the legislative successes of gay rights activists was somewhat undermined by his later as-
sertion that "[i]t is also nothing short of preposterous to call 'politically unpopular' a group which
enjoys enormous influence in American media and politics." Compare id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) with id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The unfortunate effect of these statements is to bring to
mind those people who once claimed to condemn anti-Semitism while simultaneously railing against
the allegedly disproportionate number of Jews in certain industries or professions. See NORMAN F.
CANTOR, THE SACRED CHAIN: THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS 311-12 (1994) (noting common perception
of Jews as corrupt schemers in higher levels of finance, commerce, and industry).
26. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633, 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19971
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ity should be deemed similar to race or religion for equal protection pur-
poses.28
Scalia's basic argument in Romer is that the political majority may
use the civil law to protect certain societal customs and mores. The argu-
ment rests upon the initial premise that the law is not only permitted to
shape popular morality but is effectively able to do so. This theory is illus-
trated by Scalia's comments that the majority can "preserve traditional
American moral values" and "prevent" its "deterioration" through legisla-
tion.29 This argument, though subtly made, is critical to Scalia's dissent,
for if legislation cannot preserve or protect societal mores, the law loses its
claim to legitimacy30 and becomes little more than a cudgel for the strong
to use against the weak in order to create a conformist society.
However, Scalia's major premise is that hostility and moral disap-
proval constitute a legitimate basis for enacting laws. This claim, which is
discussed in Part IV.A, is based on Scalia's belief that morality is a mere
political issue that is most appropriately resolved through the political and
28. Although no one can doubt the sincerity of Scalia's belief that homosexuality is not akin to
race or religion, the factual and legal basis of his position is unclear. Many experts now believe that
there is little, if any, choice involved in a person's sexual orientation, just as there is little, if any,
choice involved in determining a person's race. See William A. Henry III, Born Gay? TIME, July 26,
1993, at 36 (noting possible genetic origins of homosexuality but acknowledging complexity of is-
sue); Larry Thompson, Searchfor a Gay Gene, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 60 (same). See also William
N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Honsexuality, and Collisions of Lib-
erty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2419 (1997); Timothy W. Reinig,
Comment, Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic Law and Polity,
38 BUFF. L. REV. 859,'876 (1990). In addition, iexual orientation is as important to a person's self-
identification as is religion, so that discrimination on the basis of sexuality can be highly damaging to
a person's psyche. See Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 101,
118 n.100 (1995) ("To the extent that degrading behavior affects a victim's psyche, altering both his
attitudes and ambitions, it prevents him from implementing a virtuous life plan."); Eskridge, supra, at
2411. Obviously, there is at least as much animosity towards gays and lesbians as there once was (or
arguably still is) towards persons of minority races or religious faiths. See Henry, supra. Therefore, it
seems logical to conclude that because sexuality is a potentially immutable trait that is of vital impor-
tance to all persons, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (whether it be homosexual or
heterosexual) is impermissible under current American constitutional law. See Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (denying constitutionality of "status" crimes which impose penalties
based on traits "which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily"). See also JM. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2323-24, 2366-67 (1997) (noting immutability is not a
necessary or sufficient element to create a status group; also noting it is the attached social meaning
that is relevant, not the trait itself).
29. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. This concept is described by Lon Fuller in his list of the eight ways in which the rule of law
may fail. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 39. One "route[ ] to disaster" is the creation of laws requiring
the impossible. See id. at 39, 70-79 (citing Lilbume's 1645 England's Birth-Right Justified as calling
such provisions "lawless unlimited power"). In other words, if the law is unable to preserve or protect
morality, it has set out to do the impossible and is therefore unlawful.
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legislative process. According to Scalia, a decision that burdens a minor-
ity group based on that group's breach of the majority moral code does not
violate human rights or basic democratic principles, but merely reflects the
proper workings of the political system. 31 If, however, hostility is not, by
itself, a legitimate purpose for legislation, then one of Scalia's express
justifications in favor of Amendment 2 fails.
Scalia's second argument, which is discussed in Part IV.B, is that the
state may use the civil law to burden whatever it may criminalize. Under
this theory, Scalia felt that Bowers v. Hardwick3 2 should have controlled
the issue at bar.33 However, if the criminal law and the civil law are found
not to be interchangeable, but to have different goals and remedies, then
Scalia cannot rely on Bowers's precedential value.
IV. LOGIC AND LEGITIMACY:
SCALIA'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AMENDMENT 2
A. "ANIMUS" AS AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR LAW
Scalia's major rationale for upholding Amendment 2 is that "moral
disapproval" or "animus" constitutes a proper basis for law.34 This claim
is different than the argument that the state may legislate on matters of mo-
rality; that argument concerns the scope of legitimate state action based on
both the purpose of the law at issue and its ability to actually bring about
the desired result. Scalia's approval of hostility as a proper basis for law
presupposes the legitimacy of state interference in matters of morality and
instead focuses on the quantity and quality of popular sentiment needed by
31. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1621 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It bears noting that some courts have
held that criminal or civil legislation that burdens individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation
does in fact violate international human rights. See generally Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186
(1988) (holding Article 8(2) of European Convention, which permits some restrictions to privacy
based on "protection of morals," could not be used to permit national governments to limit consensual
homosexual acts); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981) (same).
32. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of laws criminalizing sodomy).
33. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As a threshold matter, however,
Scalia may have made a mistake common to many lower courts that believe precedents set in privacy
cases (that is, Bowers) control equal protection cases and vice versa. See Gey, supra note 4, at 398
n.295; D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REV. 67, 72 n.17 (1993). The Bowers Court expressly declined to consider equal protection
claims against the Georgia statute, since no such claims had been raised by the parties. See Bowers,
478 U.S. at 196 & n.8. But cf. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 573 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Bowers as foreclosing or discouraging equal protection
claims); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,464 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
34. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Balkin, supra note 28, at
2317 n.5 (noting Scalia's emphasis on animus and social stigma regarding homosexuality).
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a state in order to enact morality legislation. However, allowing the state
to act on the basis of animosity toward minority groups violates not only
established jurisprudence but the Constitution as well.
1. Jurisprudential Approaches to Moral Disapproval as a Basis for Law
Few theorists explicitly permit legislation based on moral disap-
proval.35 Devlin is one of the few who advocate such an approach, based
on his belief that society may act to protect and perpetuate popular moral-
ity, not because the breach of a moral principle causes injury to any one
individual, but because society as a whole suffers harm from such a
breach. 36 Even in the face of scholarly criticism, Devlin refused to draw
any "theoretical limits to legislation against immorality, ' 37 a position he
steadfastly defended despite his belief that "there must be toleration of the
maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the integrity of soci-
ety. 3
8
For Devlin, the identification of the limits of toleration is closely
linked to his belief that moral disapproval may, and in fact must, be given
legal voice. In defining what acts may be legally restricted, "[fit is not
nearly enough to say that a majority dislike a practice; there must be a real
feeling of reprobation."39 In addition, Devlin stated, "I do not think one
can ignore disgust if it is deeply felt and not manufactured. Its presence is
a good indication that the bounds of toleration are being reached. Not eve-
rything is to be tolerated. No society can do without intolerance, indigna-
tion and disgust. ... 40
35. Although many jurists offer various theories on the ability or disability of the law to act in
the area of morality, few delve into the issue of what sentiments associated with immorality form a
legitimate basis for law. Nevertheless, at least one commentator has argued that laws based on
"disgust" or "animus" at the acts of others are actually "cultural offenses" that are more dangerous
than the immoral behavior itself. See JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 47 (1985); Dalton, supra note 4, at 903-05; Henkin, supra note 5, at 399 (arguing
that attempts to regulate morality may "aggravate the very evils at which these laws are directed" and
citing Prohibition as an example). Others note that disputes over morality legislation often involve
intrasocietal conflict over various groups' relative status. See Balkin, supra note 28, at 2331-32 &
n.66, 2336. The competing groups may appropriate the language of moral approval or disapproval in
their battle for supremacy. See id. at 2331.
36. See DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 8. See also HART, supra note 1, at 48-49 (discussing Devlin's
theory).
37. DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 14.
38. Id. at viii.
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. James Fitzjames Stephen, one of the few other jurists to support giving moral disap-
proval a legal voice, believed that there were some acts that were so inherently revolting as to be ac-
tionable despite the absence of harm to others. See FEINBERG, supra note 7, at 156. However, like
Devlin, Stephen required a high degree of social consensus before adopting any particular morality
[Vol. 7 1:1
HeinOnline  -- 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 10 1997-1998
1997] SCALIA AS LORD DEVLIN
However, Devlin did not advocate legislation on the basis of hostility
alone; he also required calm, dispassionate reason in order to limit the
number of legal prohibitions to those that were absolutely necessary.41
Under his "man in the jury box" approach, Devlin only permitted the state
to enforce a matter of morality if it met three requirements: (i) unanimity;
(ii) patient, reasoned deliberation; and (iii) direct effect. 42 Notably, this
approach does not require any analysis as to whether the common morality
is good or bad but merely whether such a morality exists.43
There are several problems with this approach, both in theory and in
practice. For example, Devlin required unanimity within society prior to
enacting morality legislation that banned or burdened an immoral act.44
However, Devlin cannot mean that absolute unanimity must be obtained
law and prohibited punishment where "public opinion as expressed in the common practice of society
does not strenuously and unequivocally condemn .... To be able to punish a moral majority must be
overwhelming." JAMES FITZAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 173-74 (1873),
quoted in HART, supra note 1, at 62.
41. See DEVLIN, supra note 2, at ix, 90.
42. See id. at 90. These are the same requirements needed for a jury verdict. Devlin believed
that this approach mitigated the possibility that the law would be used merely to enforce majority
prejudices.
43. See id. at 89-90. Devlin believed that considerations of whether the common morality is
good or bad, right or wrong, would already have been made by individuals within the society. See id.
However, this type of system is at odds with modem notions of human rights, which recognize that
there are certain disfavored groups who, because of their unique status, are sure to be discriminated
against if the majority opinion were to prevail. See generally Dorothy V. Jones, The Declaratory
Tradition in Modem International Law, in TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 42, 48-50 (Terry
Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992); Welch, supra note 33, at 94. On the other hand, most human
rights documents permit states to limit the enforcement of rights based on moral concerns. See Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I, art. 29(2), at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration] (subjecting all rights to 'just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society"); International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, arts.
12(3), 14(1), 19(3)(b), 21, 22(2), at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (limiting vari-
ous rights to protect public morals). See also BVerfGE 389 (1957), as cited in MARK W. JANIS &
RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 208 n.37 (1990) (holding
that although the German Constitution provided some protection for minority moralities, the state had
the right to prohibit infringement of the moral code, and noting moral disapproval was the decisive
element). But c
. 
Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988) (holding Article 8(2) of European
Convention, which permits some restrictions to privacy based on "protection of morals," could not be
used to permit national governments to limit consensual homosexual acts); Dudgeon v. United King-
dom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981) (same). See also R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.R. 452, 466-67, 497
(Can.) (upholding obscenity law but refusing to rely on argument based on protection of morals as
defined by majority moral code).
44. Devlin defined immorality "for the purpose of the law, [as] what every right-minded person
is presumed to consider to be immoral." DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 15. Devlin's presumption that all
"right-minded" persons would agree on a single moral code is itself problematic, for if history has
taught us anything, it is that little can be presumed in matters of morality, especially since most people
will presume that others believe exactly as they do. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 903.
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prior to enacting morality laws, for if there were in fact true unanimity
within a society, there would be either (i) no need to enact the law at issue,
since moral behavior would be universally practiced on a voluntary basis,
or (ii) no need to enforce such a law, since there would be no violations of
it.45 The problem therefore is how to decide what level of unanimity is
necessary to enforce morality legislation.46 Although he does not explic-
itly identify what numbers are necessary, Devlin seems to contemplate
something much more than a simple majority, since he has modeled his
theory on a jury verdict, and those Anglo-American courts that permit less
than unanimous verdicts usually require at least a five-sixths (or ten-
twelfths) majority. Under this analysis, Amendment 2 would have failed
to garner the support of a sufficiently large segment of the population.
47
In addition to unanimity, Devlin required patient and deliberate deci-
sionmaking prior to enacting morality legislation. However, animus is
seldom inspired by calm, rational thought; it is more often based upon
misunderstood half-truths, stereotypes, or fear.4" Nowhere else in the law
is emotion alone considered a sufficient basis for legislation.49 As Ronald
Dworkin says, "We distinguish moral positions from emotional reactions,
not because moral positions are supposed to be unemotional or dispas-
sionate-quite the reverse is true-but because the moral position is sup-
posed to justify the emotional reaction, and not vice versa."50
Finally, Devlin required that morality legislation be directly effective.
However, although Devlin does not say so, no scheme can be directly ef-
fective where there is a lack of consistent enforcement. In fact, consis-
tency is impossible where the application of a law depends entirely upon
the moral stance of the party applying the law and not on that of the person
45. This hypothesis is based on the premise that people will not act in a manner they believe is
immoral. Although there are plenty of examples of people behaving contrary to popularly accepted
moral norms, most misbehavior is rationalized by the individual actor as not being really immoral.
Few people can or will voluntarily act contrary to their own moral beliefs.
46. Another question is who should be included among the group of arbitrators. See FEINBERO,
supra note 7, at 137 (discussing whether dissenters should be included among persons deciding what
constitutes popular morality).
47. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Amend-
ment 2 passed with only 54% majority).
48. See Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 1000-
01 (1966) [hereinafter Dworkin, Lord Devlin].
49. For example, juries are often explicitly admonished to avoid acting on mere emotion when
deciding damage awards.
50. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 250 (1978); Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra
note 48, at 996.
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to whom it is applied.51 When the law imposes a burden on factors other
than the burdened party's own acts and mental state, it lacks the consis-
tency, predictability, and legitimacy that is required under the rule of
law. 52
Many commentators opposed Devlin's approach on the ground that
the majority could not be trusted to legislate in areas of morality. Devlin
disagreed, concluding that such are the dangers of a democracy, and unless
society is willing to reject democracy for a different political model, such
deficiencies must be accepted.53  However, Devlin disregarded the argu-
ment that even if the majority is theoretically justified in legislating mo-
rality, that does not mean it should do so in every possible circumstance.
54
Other commentators have recognized that there are many instances where
a moral duty may exist without any corresponding legal duty.55
51. If a law imposes legal penalties based on the moral perspective of someone other than the
person upon whom liability will fall, then the burdened party cannot control his legal fate solely by
altering his own behavior. For example, Amendment 2 would allow a homosexual person to be
treated differently by two different persons, one of whom is homophobic and the other of whom is not.
Those who did not disapprove of homosexuality would not discriminate, while those who did, would.
Critically, it is not the burdened party's homosexuality that triggers the legal liability, for if it were,
then the discrimination would be mandatory in all cases. Instead, it is a third party's hostile or disap-
proving response to homosexuality that initiates the discrimination. This transformation of how li-
ability is triggered is both anomalous and alarming, since the law has traditionally acted only in cases
where the acts and mental state of the party on whom liability was imposed was at issue. This type of
law can also be considered violative of the Due Process Clause in that the variation in enforcement
and penalties result in a failure to give a homosexual person "fair notice not only of the conduct that
will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty" that may ensue. BMW of N.
Am. Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 & 1599 n.22 (1996) (noting that Due Process Clause grants
basic protections against judgments without notice).
52. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 39. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 955, 968 (1995).
53. See DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 91-93. However, there are many who believe that allowing
the majority to impose its morality on others is a "misunderstanding of the democratic process," as it
transforms the idea that political power in a democracy rests in the hands of the majority into the idea
that the majority may do whatever it wishes with that power. See HART, supra note 1, at 77-81
(coining the phrase "moral populism" to describe such processes). See also Gey, supra note 4, at 403;
Smith, supra note 7, at 327; Welch, supra note 33, at 101-02.
54. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY 313-14
(Hafner Publishing 1948) (1823). See also DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 14, 16 (noting no theoretical lim-
its to morality legislation).
55. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 54, at 313-14. For example, tort law recognizes that al-
though there may be a moral duty to assist a person in distress, there is no legal duty to do so. See,
e.g., Tanja v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding moral
but no legal duty for colleges to warn of or protect students from date rape); Rhodes v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270 (11. 1996) (holding moral but no legal duty to rescue stranger);
Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976) (holding moral but no legal duty for garage
operator to protect pedestrians from negligence of its patrons); Brown Forman Corp. v. Brune, 893
S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tx. Ct. App. 1995) (holding moral but no legal duty for alcohol manufacturer or
distributor to warn consumers of dangers of excessive alcohol consumption). See also RESTATEMENT
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Despite his analogy to "the man in the jury box," Devlin, like Scalia,
believed that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, was the natural en-
forcer of society's moral code.56 However, he also recognized that "in the
legislative process the forces of inertia are considerable; and in matters of
morals negative legislation is especially difficult, because relaxation is
thought to imply approval." 57 For this reason, Devlin believed that the
common law had an important role to play in the reshaping of legal stan-
dards and thus did not rule out the possibility that change could come from
the judiciary.58
In Romer, Scalia takes a more extreme position than does Devlin, de-
nying that any sort of change in the laws reflecting legally enforceable mo-
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (refusing to recognize legal duty to come to strangers' aid even
though there may be moral duty to do so). For a discussion of the differences and conflicts between
moral and legal duties, see FULLER, supra note 7, at 5-15.
56. DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 95. However, Devlin based his opinion on the belief that
"[l]egislation of that sort is not usually made an election issue." Id. Today, by contrast, a candidate's
position on moral issues is often an election issue for both incumbents and their challengers. See Ann
DeFrange, Re-Elections Survive Scandals, Expert Says, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 15, 1996, at I
(citing recent Gallup poll stating "many Americans care more about morality issues than economic
issues in [1996] election"); Elyce Wakerman, Alliance Seeks to Counter Religious Right Politics, L.A.
TIMES, June 29, 1996, at B4 (stating that issues of morality are expected to dominate 1996 election).
In addition, Devlin's belief that the legislature was the proper arbiter of legally enforceable mores may
have been based on certain peculiarities of the English legislative process that do not exist in the
American legislative system. See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1005. For example, the method by
which English statutes are written and revised make them much more reflective of popular will than
American statutes are. See id. at 1005-06. Therefore, Scalia's and others' reliance on the ability of
the legislature to enact popular morality, if based on British jurists' opinions, may be misplaced.
57. DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 99.
58. See id. at 99-100. Devlin was strongly influenced by a then-recent case, Shaw v. Director
(f Public Prosecutions, in which the House of Lords (Britain's highest court) rediscovered a latent
judicial power to "conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State."
[1962] App. Cas. 220, 267 (appeal taken from C.C.A.), quoted in DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 88. The
House of Lords justified its ability to act on the ground that the state must be able to determine what
conduct was contra bonos mores and to rule accordingly. See id. Devlin argued that this power could
not be used to implement a Platonic political model but would allow such decisions on the ground that
"society may legislate to preserve itself." Id. at 89. Hart opposed cases such as Shaw as either consti-
tuting gross violations of individual liberty or as disregarding rules requiring certainty in the law
and/or prohibiting ex post facto laws. See HART, supra note 1, at 12 (citing John Stuart Mill and Jer-
emy Bentham). See also FULLER, supra note 7, at 38-39 (citing eight requirements for lawful legal
system).
Scalia has also been faced with a case in which he ruled based on the state's ability to dictate
what was contra bonos mores. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring with plurality opinion) (upholding Indiana statute outlawing public nudity despite First
Amendment challenge by exotic dancers who wanted to perform totally nude). In that case, he laid
the groundwork for his opinion in Romer that moral disapproval constituted a sufficient and legitimate
basis for law. See id. (permitting enforcement of "traditional moral belief that people should not ex-
pose their private parts indiscriminately"); id. at 580 (describing "moral opposition" as providing ra-
tional basis for law in Bowers).
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rality can originate in the courts. 59 His belief is that the legislature is the
proper arbiter of whether and to what extent morality should be reflected
in the law.60 However, Scalia's approach implicitly requires an abdication
of judicial review in matters of morality.61 Although this may comply
59. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think it no
business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.").
60. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also West, supra note 4, at 674 (describing conservative
deference to legislature). Although Scalia makes this point several times in his dissent, he does not
explain the basis for his conclusion. One possibility is that it is based on his interpretation of the po-
litical question doctrine. Under that doctrine, the judiciary must refrain from interfering with the acts
of the political branches if there is:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (requiring such factors to be "[pirominent on the surface of
any case"). Typically, the political question doctrine applies in a limited category of cases involving,
inter alia, foreign relations, dates of duration of hostilities, validity of enactments, status of Native
American tribes, and definitions of the republican form of government. See id. at 211-18. The politi-
cal question doctrine is further limited by the presumption that it does not apply to important individ-
ual rights. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.16, at 297 (2d ed. 1992); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 584 (1966). Because Amendment 2
implicated individual rights, or, at the very least, failed to raise the types of issues discussed in Baker,
369 U.S. at 217, the political question doctrine does not seem applicable.
Alternatively, Scalia could be relying on the separation of powers doctrine to support his opin-
ion that the legislature should be the sole arbiter of whether and to what extent morality should be
enforced by law. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (1989) (stating "there is no one more fond of our system of separation of
powers than I am"). However, commentators have noted that:
although a standard of review whose overriding value is deference to the legislative branch
seems to support the principle of separation of powers... [there is] a powerful argument that
the separation of powers principle can only be rightly understood in the context of protection
of the liberty interests now referenced by the Due Process Clause, implying a more active re-
view.
Welch, supra note 33, at 97 n.198 (citations omitted). Scalia's reliance on the will of the legislature is
not greatly influenced by this formulation of the separation of powers doctrine, since he follows an
interpretive approach that demands that the rational basis standard utilized in a substantive due proc-
ess review "not act as a check on the community's morality but instead refer[ ] the Court to that mo-
rality." Id. at 96. However, Romer did not come to the Court as a privacy case but as an equal pro-
tection case. Under an equal protection analysis, the Court may not simply enforce the community
standard of morality and therefore may not merely rely upon the legislature to identify and create the
proper standard. See id. at 96, 100. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (comparing a
due process and an equal protection analysis). Therefore, Scalia's reliance on legislative interpreta-
tions of popular morality may be misplaced. See Welch, supra note 33, at 96-97. See also supra note
33.
61. See Welch, supra note 33, at 86-91, 96-97. See also Eskridge, supra note 28, at 2413
(arguing that Scalia's position in Romer requires judicial neutrality in culture clashes). Cf. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree that either the length
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with his general suspicions of the review powers of nine unelected
judges, 62 it is the duty of the Court to decide whether legislation complies
with constitutional principles. 63 The constitutional requirement that jus-
tices be unelected was established in order to allow them to act outside the
political fray so that they may objectively determine whether legislation is
constitutionally permissible.64 In fact, judicial review demands the kind of
calm, rational, deliberative analysis required by Devlin. Although in some
situations judicial review will require the Court to side with one political
group over another, it is not necessarily because the Court is making policy
or because it is becoming politicized, but because the winning side has the
constitutionally valid position.
Scalia's hesitation to apply judicial scrutiny to morality legislation
can create several problems. First, it can transform judicial review into
nothing more than a rubber stamp for popular morality. If the constitu-
tional system of checks and balances (let alone constitutional rights) is to
make any sense, that cannot occur. Second, it denies the common law a
role in morality legislation, a role that Devlin at least believed useful and
necessary to the proper workings of a democracy. 65
of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw
legislation from this Court's scrutiny.").
62. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297,
1304-07 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989).
There is an alternative way to look at the situation, however.
A legislator [or judge] who ... refuses to take popular indignation, intolerance and disgust as
the moral conviction of his community, is not guilty of moral elitism. He is not simply set-
ting his own educated views against those of a vast public which rejects them. He is doing
his best to enforce a distinct, and fundamentally important, part of his community's morality,
a consensus more essential to society's existence in the form we know it than the opinion
Lord Devlin bids him follow.
Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 1002.
63. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 60, § 1.1-1.6, at 1-72; 1 KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.5, at 53 (1994) ("[Ihe
independent judiciary was assigned the task of keeping the two politically accountable Branches
within the boundaries established by the Constitution .... ); Balkin, supra note 28, at 2367-68.
64. This could be seen as a limited check on the absence of any popular determination that any
specific morality law is objectively good or bad. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy:
Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 695-96, 702-03
(1996) (noting that narrow interpretive approaches tend to increase the number of constitutional
amendments; also noting increase in the politicization of the Constitution should amendments become
commonplace).
65. See DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 99. See also Sullivan, supra note 64, at 695-96, 702 (noting
benefits of broad interpretation of judiciary's role in constitutional law). Cf. Miriam Galston, Taking
Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative
Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329, 368 (1994) (discussing ways in which the Supreme Court "can be a
source of moral education, a force for questioning and revising beliefs, and an instigator of public
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Interestingly, Devlin requires a higher level of negative emotions and
communal consensus in order to justify the enforcement of morality than
does Scalia. For example, whereas Devlin requires unanimity of opinion,
accompanied by the hallmarks of "intolerance, indignation and disgust,"
Scalia holds that the animus, moral disapproval, or hostility of a simple
majority can be a sufficient basis for morality legislation.66
One reason why Devlin was more exacting in his categorization of
actionable emotions may be because they were his only guide for limiting
the power of the state. Only when popular sentiment reached the level of
"intolerance, indignation and disgust" could the state intervene. In con-
trast, Scalia claims to use the objective standard of tradition to identify
those behaviors that may be regulated.67 However, once certain conduct
has been deemed immoral under this historical analysis, then it may be
burdened or disfavored for perpetuity.
68
Although neither approach is desirable, in many ways Devlin's the-
ory, which requires both near unanimity and the existence of several ex-
treme emotions, is the better of the two systems. First, it raises the legal
dialogue with deep, pervasive, and permanent effects on both the opinions and characters of the citi-
zens at large").
66. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (permitting ani-
mus of 54% of Coloradans to act as basis for Amendment 2).
67. See Jeffrey Rosen, Antonin Scalia, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1714, 1715 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997).
But cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi-
cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack."). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1896-97) ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that it so was laid down in the time of Henry IV.").
68. One problem with Scalia's traditionalist approach has always been the absence of any dis-
cussion of when a law based on tradition would cease to be valid. Ostensibly, once a law is passed
prohibiting a certain behavior, then even a change in the cultural or social atmosphere would not nec-
essarily permit a change in the law, since the fact that such behavior has been burdened in the past is
deemed controlling. As long as a certain segment of society wishes to retain the law on the books, it
may do so, since legal tradition is on its side. However, this would allow one era's moral majority to
limit future generations' ability to effectuate political change, something that is strongly disfavored at
law. This approach is also inconsistent with those aspects of Scalia's dissent that claim that moral
populism is the basis for Amendment 2. For example, if traditionalists were in the minority in a cer-
tain case, Scalia would have to choose between upholding popular morality, as reflected by the politi-
cal will of the legislature, or upholding traditional values. See Gey, supra note 4, at 365-67 (noting
despite Scalia's claimed reliance on popular will, his traditionalist approach is actually antidemo-
cratic); Vest, supra note 4, at 672-73 (noting an arguable inconsistency between the idea that the
Court should give effect to original intent and the idea that it should defer to popular will). See also
Henkin, supra note 5, at 398-99, 401 ("Nor should it be assumed, without re-examination, that the
morality of an older day remains a legitimate aim of government with social import outweighing
growing claims of individual freedom.").
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 17 1997-1998
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
standard for enforcement of morality to a higher level, thus permitting
conduct that is only slightly disfavored to continue unabated. This creates
a more open, liberty-minded community. Second, it justifies judicial re-
view as a means by which the prejudices of the quasi-majority can be
curbed; if the legislature passes a certain bill that seems to infringe on fun-
damental rights, the courts may strike it, thus forcing the alleged majority
to see if they have sufficient numbers to amend the Constitution.69 If the
Constitution is amended, then the courts were wrong and social disap-
proval or animus was at a sufficiently high level to prohibit the behavior in
question.70 However, because Scalia would permit any group larger than a
simple majority to act on even the most common of social prejudices, he
has (i) created a larger realm of immoral behavior that can be regulated
and (ii) permitted a smaller number of voters to decide the level of moral
regulation in a society.7' In addition, his views regarding the immutability
69. See Sullivan, supra note 64, at 702-03 (arguing against an increase in the number of consti-
tutional amendments). This is not to argue that constitutional amendments should be common or eas-
ily obtained, or to support rampant judicial activism in order to force the public to deal with certain
moral issues; it merely recognizes a method for correcting a glaring judicial error under a Devlinesque
approach.
70. Significantly, the obverse of this argument does not necessarily hold true. Since Devlin's
and Scalia's theories are based on moral disapproval, as opposed to moral approval or tolerance, a
more restrictive law cannot be passed (or a more burdensome opinion handed down) with the edict
that dissenters should overturn the law by amending the Constitution. To do so would force a politi-
cally weak or disfavored minority to obtain a supermajority in order to protect their rights from the
acts of the very majority that burdened them in the first place, something that is patently unrealistic.
See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433 (S.D. Ohio
1994) ('To single out a group of citizens and place upon them the added and virtually insurmountable
burden in their pursuit of protection from majority discrimination thoroughly undermines the spirit of
our constitution.... [A] state may not single out and disadvantage any independently identifiable
group by making it more difficult for that group to enact legislation in its behalf; and so doing does
not 'demonstrate [a] devotion to democracy,' but rather makes a mockery of it.") (citations omitted),
rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). See also id. at 443 ("[W]e can
conceive of no legitimate governmental purpose rationally related to a law which prohibits a minority
group from ever obtaining anti-discrimination legislation on its behalf, unless it undertakes the mas-
sive and unmitigated-and likely insurmountable-burden of amending the city charter.... The pur-
pose not only to permit discrimination, but also to encourage it, is inherent in the very concept of such
a law. As such it is constitutionally defective."). On the other hand, forcing those who would create
laws based on hostility to obtain supermajorities actually protects the legitimacy of the legal system as
a whole. Because it is so difficult to obtain a large enough majority to amend the Constitution, it is
very unlikely that any amendment based merely on animus will ever be enacted because there are so
few issues that can invoke a high enough level of hatred in 75% of the population. See U.S. CONST.
art. V (requiring constitutional amendments to be ratified by three quarters of state legislatures). It is
much more likely that any group that hopes to have an amendment based upon animus adopted would
be forced to form a coalition with other segments of the electorate and create a law based, at least in
part, on a more jurisprudentially sound proposition.
71. In the case of Amendment 2, it was 54% of the voting public. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of constitutional law and judicial review tend to set in stone the values of
these smaller groups.72
Scalia and Devlin are not in the majority, however. Many more
commentators believe that it is inappropriate to allow "animus," "moral
disapproval," or even Devlin's tripartite "intolerance, indignation and dis-
gust" to form the basis of law.73 For example, Ronald Dworkin has pro-
vided a very interesting analysis of this issue in his discussion of the per-
missible bases for morality legislation, and he concludes that negative
emotions, by themselves, cannot constitute a legitimate basis for law.
74
Other commentators have opposed animus as a justification for law based
on its similarity to moral populism;75 its violation of any external or criti-
cal morality, which tends to make a mockery of the entire legal system;
76
and its general denial of any protection for minority rights.77 Each of these
arguments resounds clearly in American constitutional law.
72. See supra note 68.
73. See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, at 81; Dalton, supra note 4, at 902-04, 906-08; Dworkin,
Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 996-97, 1000-01 (discussing illegitimacy of personal feelings as basis
for law); Welch, supra note 33, at 94. See also FULLER, supra note 7, at 132-33.
74. Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 1001. Dworkin argues that a moral position could
constitute a basis for law if that position is somehow defensible under a larger critical morality. See
id. at 996. See also HART, supra note 1, at 73 (defining critical morality); Balkin, supra note 28, at
2313-14. Not every allegedly moral position can form a legitimate basis for law, however. See
Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 996. According to Dworkin, the three factors that cannot
form a legitimate basis for a moral position, and thus for morality legislation, are prejudice, personal
emotional reactions, and rationalizations. See id. at 996-97, 1001. See also Balkin, supra note 28, at
2368.
75. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
76. See HART, supra note 1, at 73. For example, if animosity toward a group or class of persons
becomes an appropriate means of shaping society, then the law will lose its legitimacy as people begin
to perceive it as nothing more than a tool for those who have formed a sufficiently large voting bloc to
force their beliefs on others. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 146-47 ("If law is simply a manifested fact
of authority or social power, then, though we can still talk about the substantive justice or injustice of
particular enactments, we can no longer talk about the degree to which a legal system as a whole
achieves the ideal of legality .... "). See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, many of those who support morality legislation argue that without such legislation
(be it based on animus or other sorts of moral disapproval), the legal system will become bereft of any
moral values and society will be left defenseless against the sort of atrocities typified by Germany's
Nazi regime. Indeed, opponents of positivism have long pointed to the inhumanities practiced under
the color of law in the Third Reich as evidence that morality legislation is as necessary to a well-
ordered society as protection against forced confession and torture. Such persons ignore, however, the
fact that many of the laws implemented during Hiter's reign were based on hostility or animus to-
wards certain groups of "undesirables," namely, Jews, homosexuals, gypsies, Communists, and the
mentally and physically handicapped. Therefore, Nazi Germany can be used as much as an example
against morality legislation as it is in favor of such legislation.
77. See Jones, supra note 43, at 48-50; Welch, supra note 33, at 94.
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2. Constitutional Approaches to Moral Disapproval as a Basis for Law
The notion that animus or hostility toward a certain disfavored group
is an inappropriate basis for law is not solely one of jurisprudential theory;
it is also widely recognized in American constitutional law. 78 As a pre-
liminary matter, it should be recognized that judicial review has long been
considered a necessary curb on the power and prejudice of the political
branches of government.79 To allow popular animosity to provide a basis
78. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438, 450 (1985)
(holding that zoning ordinance, as applied to group home for mentally retarded, was based on "an ir-
rational prejudice," and refusing to let such prejudice or "negative attitude" of nearby homeowners
justify equal protection violation against mentally retarded); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14
(1982) (striking law that would allow Texas to deny public education to illegal aliens because
"[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond
their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was de-
signed to abolish"); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979) (upholding
restrictions against class despite equal protection claim because classification "does not circumscribe a
class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation"); United States Dept. of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 n.7 (1973) (citing with approval district court's decision to reject govern-
ment's argument that "challenged classification might be justified as a means to foster 'morality');
Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963) (holding "constitutional rights may not be de-
nied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise"); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41
(1915) (prohibiting discrimination when discrimination "to which the act relates is made an end in
itself"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that discriminatory application of
local regulation of laundry facilities where all Chinese persons were denied operating permits was
based on "hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong," and ruling that such
discrimination violates Equal Protection Clause); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City
of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 443 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that law claiming to give effect to
city's "collective notion of morality.., cannot simply be a surrogate for the majority's desire to dis-
criminate against an unpopular minority group"), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 2519 (1996). See also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (noting that classifications
may not be "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law"); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 219 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A policy of selective application must
be supported by a neutral and legitimate interest-something more substantial than a habitual dislike
for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group.").
79. One of Scalia's major concerns over the course of his tenure on the bench has been his per-
ception that, without some external force to control them, judicial review will permit justices to follow
their own personal agendas free of any legal constraints. See Kannar, supra note 62, at 1304. How-
ever, as Scalia himself has recognized, the common law puts stringent requirements on how justices
are to treat precedent. See id. at 1307 (describing how Scalia's "original meaning" approach complies
with rules of precedent). There is no reason for him to believe that other justices are less concerned
about respecting precedent than he is. But cf BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1610
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When, however, a constitutional doctrine adopted by the Court is not
only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled application, I do not feel bound to give it stare de-
cisis effect .... ). For example, Ronald Dworkin has discussed the common law's use of precedent at
great length. See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DwORKIN 38, 46-78 (1991) (discussing Dworkin's theory
of integrity). Unfortunately, Scalia's disagreement with other interpretive methods requires him to
take the issue of morality out of the hands of the Supreme Court (and any court) altogether and place
it wholesale into the hands of the legislature, something which can negatively affect constitutional law
as a whole. See Sullivan, supra note 64, at 702 (noting a narrow interpretive approach (such as that
[Vol. 71:1
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for state action would effectively emasculate this well-established system
of checks and balances.
80
For example, in Marbury v. Madison, the seminal case on judicial
review and the interrelation between the different branches of government,
Justice Marshall stated:
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns,
to different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop
here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those depart-
ments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine
the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be con-
tested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it;
or, that the legislature may not alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
81
Marshal goes on to state that
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written consti-
tutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles
and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com-
pletely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what
is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition,
is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict
their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring
that those limits may be passed at pleasure. 82
The question, of course, is whether laws based on mere hostility or
practiced by Scalia) increases the need for constitutional amendments, which leads to an increasingly
politicized and code-like constitution). See also Hart, Positivism, supra note 7, at 608, 610-12
(discussing problems with excessive formalism).
80. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
82. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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disapproval of minority moralities are "repugnant" to the Constitution and
beyond the scope of legitimate state action.83 Clearly, "[i]f society has no
right to make judgements on morals, the law must find some special
justification for entering the field of morality. 8 4 However, those who
would permit morality laws to be founded on animosity believe that such
laws do not violate the Constitution because they are based on the
legitimate exercise of state power.85 As evidence of such ability on the
part of the state, advocates for morality legislation point to the numerous
cases that have expressly recognized the right of states to enforce laws that
uphold public health, safety, and morals. 86 The problem is that while those
83. Notably, the federal government, as a government of enumerated powers, has no general
police power and so cannot enforce morality on that ground. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
60, at 307. However, there is some dispute as to whether state police powers still include protection of
morals. Compare Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) (stating
the "traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health,
safety, and morals"), with Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (stating Supreme Court no longer formulates state police power as including protection of
morals).
84. DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 11.
85. See id. ("[I]f society has the right to make a judgement and has it on the basis that a recog-
nized morality is as necessary to society as, say, a recognized government, then society may use the
law to preserve morality in the same way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that is essential to its
existence."). See also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566-69 (plurality opinion).
86. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560 (noting regulation of exotic dancing was permissible
means of protecting morality); United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting an
"important government interest [in] protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of
society that still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various portions of their
fellow citizens' anatomies that traditionally in this society have been regarded as erogenous zones,"
and holding that such interest was infringed when woman walked topless in wildlife refuge); United
States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1949) (permitting trial judge to clear courtroom of specta-
tors to protect public morals, though scope of exclusion was excessive); Wreck Bar, Inc. v. Comolli,
857 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D.R.I. 1994) ("[R]easons of morality properly may be the basis of legislation
subject to rational basis analysis."); Basic Energy Corp. v. Hamilton County, 652 So. 2d 1237, 1239
(Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (noting municipality has legitimate interest in legislating on issue of morals);
Vonderhaar v. Parish of St. Tammany, 633 So. 2d 217 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (noting state obscenity
statute was permissible means of protecting public morality); Parkes v. Bartlett, 210 N.W. 492, 495
(Mich. 1926) (barring gambling and newspaper reports of sporting events from which gambling arises,
though noting that "[iut is true that the Legislature is not exclusively the judge of what is necessary to
protect the health, morals and welfare of the citizens. But concerning those matters, it inherently must
have a very large discretion."); Zeman v. Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996) (noting prohi-
bition on use of property which is proper regulation for protection of morality is not a taking). See
also Universal Declaration, supra note 43, art. 29(2) (subjecting rights to "just requirements of mo-
rality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society"); ICCPR, supra note 43, arts.
12(3), 14(1), 19(3)(b), 21, 22(2) (limiting various rights to protect public morals); Welch, supra note
33, at 96-97 (noting judiciary generally defers to legislative standard of morality in due process cases,
but not in equal protection cases). But cf Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) ("It does not at
all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of [the protection of public morals,
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cases might be used to argue that the state may regulate (or at least protect)
morality, they do not address the question of whether it can do so in order
to give voice to popular hostility against a certain group.
In concluding that animosity and hostility were appropriate bases for
law,8 7 Scalia failed to identify any cases that expressly support this
proposition. The most relevant case Scalia cites is Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., in which an Indiana statute prohibiting public nudity was permitted to
stand despite, a First Amendment challenge by exotic dancers who wanted
to perform completely nude.88 However, the plurality opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not provide Scalia with much help, since the
Court simply held that "[t]he traditional police power of the States is de-
fined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and mor-
als." 9 Significantly, the Court's opinion failed to cite moral disapproval
or animosity as a basis for the plurality opinion. On the other hand,
Scalia's concurring opinion in Barnes provided him with much more satis-
factory material for Romer. In Barnes, Scalia stated that "[o]ur society
prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not
because they harm others but because they are considered, in the tradi-
tional phrase, 'contra bonos mores,' i.e., immoral." 90 In addition, Scalia
wrote that "[t]he purpose of the Indiana statute... is to enforce the tradi-
tional moral belief that people should not expose their private parts indis-
criminately."'" In the most telling line of his concurrence, and, perhaps,
recent constitutional history,92 Scalia concluded that "[mloral opposition to
nudity supplies a rational basis for its prohibition." 93
the public health, or the public safety], is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers
of the State .... If... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the pub-
lic morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable in-
vasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby
give effect to the Constitution.") (citations omitted); Allied-General Nuclear Servs., 839 F.2d at 1576
(stating Supreme Court no longer formulates state police power as including protection of morals).
Henkin recognizes the existence of such laws, but questions their initial and continued legiti-
macy under a substantive due process analysis. See Henkin, supra note 5, at 402-07.
87. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634, 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. 501 U.S. 560, 570-72 (1991) (plurality opinion).
89. Id. at 569. But cf Allied-General Nuclear Servs., 839 F.2d at 1576 (stating Supreme Court
no longer formulates state police power as including protection of morals).
90. 501 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Robin West has argued that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was the first Su-
preme Court case to adopt "an explicitly conservative jurisprudential account of the 'natural' right of
the community to define and enforce the good in law." West, supra note 4, at 663. Scalia's concur-
rence in Barnes seems to take that notion a step further and permit the majority not just to "define and
enforce the good in law" but to affirmatively burden those acts of which it disapproves. Id. See also
Welch, supra note 33, at 101-02 (noting that shift toward "constitutional populism," an interpretive
1997]
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Although Barnes provided Scalia with at least some arguable support
for his dissent in Romer,94 Barnes itself is somewhat suspect due to its
constitutional novelty95 and Scalia's possible mischaracterization of
White's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. In Barnes, Scalia claimed that
Bowers upheld the "prohibition of private homosexual sodomy enacted
solely on the 'presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in [the juris-
diction] that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.' 96 How-
ever, the line partially quoted by Scalia was taken somewhat out of con-
text. The full text reads:
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent
asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is
none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unaccept-
able. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law. The
law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respon-
dent makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the
morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not
agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States
should be invalidated on this basis. 97
Although the text certainly does not negate the idea that the law may
be influenced by popular morality, it does not specifically state that animus
or hostility are a proper basis of law, either.98 In fact, some commentators
have noted that Bowers's central holding, that is, that "[t]he law... is
constantly based on notions of morality," is contradicted by a long line of
First Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court has held that "the law
may not be based on the political majority's moral choices."9 9 In addition,
method that has been criticized as a "backward looking test" that accepts the "current moral fashion as
a rational basis" for law, began with Barnes and Bowers).
93. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also West, supra note 4, at 664-65
(stating that in Bowers the Court permitted "moral opposition to homosexuality" to provide a rational
basis for law at issue).
94. Obviously, as a mere concurrence, Scalia's opinion in Barnes does not constitute clear and
controlling precedent.
95. See Welch, supra note 33, at 101-02.
96. 501 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
98. But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Gey, supra note 4, at 361. In deciding not to recognize a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual conduct, the Bowers Court seemed to rely most on the belief that such acts were not
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they]
were sacrificed."' Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
[Vol. 71:1
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although both Rehnquist's and Scalia's opinions in Barnes claim that legis-
lating morality is a constitutionally permissible legislative end, between
them they were only able to cite for that proposition two then-recent Su-
preme Court cases and one district court case,100 none of which stated that
animus or hostility is a permissible basis for law.
Of the cases cited in Barnes, Bowers is the most well-known and has
the language that is most likely to provide support for those who would
permit hostility or animus towards a certain group to act as a basis for law.
Even there, however, such support is limited, since White's majority
opinion contained no explicit reference to moral disapproval as a legiti-
mate basis for law.10 1 In fact, the only mention made by White of moral
disapproval of homosexuality was in his enumeration of the history of an-
tisodomy laws, which very carefully avoided expressing approval of the
rationales inherent in such laws. 102 Therefore, it may be arguable but is in
no way clear that the majority opinion in Bowers should be considered as
providing support for those who would argue that animus and hostility are
legitimate bases for law.
Burger's concurring opinion is also not helpful to Scalia, for it fails to
explicitly state that hostility or moral disapproval is a permissible basis for
law.0 3 In fact, the only place in Bowers that explicitly discussed animus
being used as the basis for legislation was in the Blackmun dissent, where
it was roundly rejected."°
The second case cited by the Barnes Court to support the conclusion
that morality may form a legitimate basis for law is Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton.1°5 In that case, as in Barnes, the Court was faced with a First
(1937)). However, nothing in the Palko line of cases would seem to suggest that animosity or hostil-
ity toward a group was a permissible basis for law.
100. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196;
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) as "implicitly" accepting "that a legislature could legitimately act.., to protect 'the social in-
terest in order and morality'); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J.).
101. At the most, White stated that "[t]he law ... is constantly based on notions of morality."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
102. See id. at 192-94.
103. The farthest Burger went down this line of reasoning was to note that "[clondemnation of
[sodomy] is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards." Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Nothing was said about U.S. legal standards.
104. "No matter how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we
have held that '[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation
of a person's physical liberty."' Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
105. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
19971
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Amendment challenge to a state obscenity law. 116 In refusing to strike the
law as unconstitutional, the Court held that "[in deciding Roth, this Court
implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a con-
clusion [that there was a connection between antisocial behavior and ob-
scene material] to protect 'the social interest in order and morality."" 0'1 7
However, the Court was far from permitting animus and hostility to influ-
ence its decision; in fact, the majority opinion went on to state that
[tihe issue in this context goes beyond whether someone, or even the
majority, considers the conduct depicted as "wrong" or "sinful." The
States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public
exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material has a ten-
dency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety,
or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's words, the States'
"right... to maintain a decent society." 1
0 8
Both Paris Adult Theatre I and Roth' 09 rely on the same reasoning,
namely that in the context of speech
[i]t has been well observed that such [lewd and obscene] utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.Ito
This passage suggests that obscenity laws such as those that were at issue
in Paris Adult Theatre I, Roth, and Barnes are not based on popular
animus against immoral publications or acts but on the Court's "rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.""' In fact,
the Court in Roth went on to state that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection
of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests." '112 Therefore, the Court was not
concerned with morality per se or with regulating acts that were contra
bonos mores; it was balancing the interest of the individual to speak versus
the interest of society in hearing the individual speak in the prohibited
106. See id. at 51-52. Paris Adult Theatre I dealt with pornographic films, not live dancing as in
Barnes.
107. Id. at 60-61 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957)).
108. Id. at 69 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1965) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
109. Roth concerned the regulation of allegedly obscene written materials. See Roth, 354 U.S. at
480-81.
110. Paris Adult Theatre ! 413 U.S. at 61 n.12 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485) (emphasis omit-
ted).
111. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
112. Id.
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manner. Because the type of speech in question had "such slight social
value as a step to truth," ' 3 society, given its interest in, inter alia, popular
morality, was given the opportunity to prohibit that particular type of
speech. The mere fact that ideas might be "hateful" to most persons was
not enough to exclude an idea or opinion from the public sphere; there had
to be a total lack of "redeeming social importance" to do so.114
However, in Romer, speech is not at issue. Instead, it is a person's
sexual orientation that is being burdened, something that "may well form
part of the very fiber of an individual's personality." ' 15 Because there is
no social value to allowing hatred or animosity toward a group of people to
prevail, even when those people are ostensibly classified by their partici-
pation in an act "hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion,"1 6 analyses
which focus on the social value of certain types of speech cannot form the
precedential basis for decisions burdening various aspects of personhood.
Instead, the approach used in Wisconsin v. Yoder might be more appropri-
ate: "There can be no assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the
Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even
erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be con-
demned because it is different."' 1 7
Although Roth, Paris Adult Theatre I, Barnes, and Bowers have all
been used to justify the use of animus or hostility as a legitimate basis for
law, it is a lower court decision, Dronenburg v. Zech,l"5 that is most ex-
plicit about the permissibility of such actions and that is most on point in
that it addresses acts, not speech. Dronenburg reviewed the constitution-
ality of the U.S. Navy's policy of automatic discharge upon proof of ho-
mosexual activity." 9 The appellant, a sailor who had been discharged af-
ter engaging in homosexual conduct, claimed that the regulation in
question could not be legitimately based on "the existence of moral disap-
113. Id. at 485 (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 484.
115. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,202-03 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 98 n.14 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S.
at 484). However, because Scalia would permit homosexual orientation to act as a stand-in for homo-
sexual conduct, there is little concern about the act requirement; instead, homosexual status alone
seems to be the criterion for imposition of the legal burden.
117. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972). See also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Notably, the opinion was written by Circuit Judge Bork
and joined by then-Circuit Judge Scalia.
119. See id. at 1388-89.
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proval."'120 In upholding the Navy's policy, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court stated as a preliminary matter that "[w]e have said that legisla-
tion may implement morality,"'' but gave no further citation. Instead, the
court justified its action by claiming that striking the regulation in question
would "render legislation about civil rights, worker safety, the preservation
of the environment, and much more unconstitutional" because "in each of
these areas, legislative majorities have made moral choices contrary to the
desires of minorities."' 22 The circuit court went on to say that
[appellant's] theory that majority morality and majority choice is always
made presumptively invalid by the Constitution attacks the very predi-
cate of democratic government. When the Constitution does not speak
to the contrary, the choices of those put in authority by the electoral
process, or those who are accountable to such persons, come before us
not as suspect because majoritarian but as conclusively valid for that
very reason.1
23
However, the court explicitly stressed that "because the possibility of
being misunderstood is so great.. .,this deference to democratic choice
does not apply where the Constitution removes the choice from majori-
ties."124 This final line suggests that even those who support morality leg-
islation recognize that there are instances when the legislature cannot act,
including, possibly, cases where hostility forms the basis for law.
Scalia's statement to the contrary notwithstanding, 125 there are a large
number of cases that explicitly state that discrimination based on animus,
hostility, or any sort of prejudice against a disfavored group is unconstitu-
tional. 2 6 The'vast majority of these cases are based on equal protection
120. Id. at 1397. Although the circuit court refused to accept appellant's argument that law
should not be based on moral disapproval, it did not explicitly rule that moral disapproval of the ma-
jority was the basis for upholding the law in question; instead, the basis of the circuit court's decision
seems to be that the regulation in question was intended to further the discipline and morale that is
necessary for a well-functioning navy. See id. at 1398.
121. Id. at 1398.
122. Id. at 1397.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (noting legislature is lim-
ited by principles and theory of government). See also Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (noting that classifi-
cations may not be "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law"); Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 219 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A policy of selective application
must be supported by a neutral and legitimate interest-something more substantial than a habitual
dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group."); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (1985) (holding that zoning ordinance, as applied to group home for mentally
retarded, was based on "an irrational prejudice," and refusing to let such prejudice or "negative atti-
tude" of nearby homeowners justify equal protection violation against mentally retarded); Plyler v.
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claims, which was the theory advanced by the plaintiff in Romer. Com-
mentators have argued that equal protection analyses are generally much
more rigorous than due process analyses, despite the fact that the two tests
are at least facially similar.127 In fact, due process cases are marked by an
extremely high degree of deference to the legislative will. 128  This defer-
ence is due to the fact that these claims are judged by a communal standard
of what process is due, a test that is very sensitive to popular views of mo-
rality. Because this test relies so heavily on community sentiment, 129 ani-
mus and hostility could arguably form the basis for law if courts refuse to
exercise their independent judgment regarding what is a constitutionally
legitimate basis for law.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (striking law that would allow Texas to deny public education to
illegal aliens because "1l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of
circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to abolish"); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979)
(upholding restrictions against class of methadone users despite equal protection claim because clas-
sification "does not circumscribe a class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait or affilia-
tion"); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("[l]f the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental in-
terest."); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963) (holding "constitutional rights may not be
denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise"); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41
(1915) (prohibiting discrimination when the activity "to which the act relates is made an end in it-
self"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that discriminatory application of
regulation of laundry facilities where all Chinese persons were denied operating permit was based on
"hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong," and ruling such discrimination
was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 443 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that law claiming to give effect to city's
"collective notion of morality... cannot simply be a surrogate for the majority's desire to discrimi-
nate against an unpopular minority group"), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct.
2519 (1996).
127. See Welch, supra note 33, at 96. See also Gey, supra note 4, at 398 n.295.
128. See Welch, supra note 33, at 96-97 ("If, however, the content of the Due Process Clause is
supplied by the community then, according to conventional wisdom, legislatures are in better posi-
tions than courts to interpret and give voice to that morality."). However, there are certain fundamen-
tal norms that exist outside the scope of due process review that may not be "ignored or overridden by
a majority vote in a legislative body." Id. at 100. While advocates of morality legislation in general
and of animosity-based laws in particular could argue that laws such as Amendment 2 do not violate
these norms, their opponents would argue that they do.
129. See id. at 96 (listing what elements "give content to the due process requirement"). See
also Balkin, supra note 28, at 2342 n.87. But see Welch, supra note 33, at 96-97 (arguing there are
fundamental constitutional norms which courts cannot ignore even under a highly deferential standard
of review). See also Balkin, supra note 28, at 2313-14 (arguing that democracy and the Constitution
must be analyzed within a democratic culture). Although due process analyses have always been
somewhat deferential to the legislature, with Barnes and Bowers the Court has become even more
likely to permit legislatures to act virtually independently. See Welch, supra note 33, at 102. This
form of "constitutional populism" is often marked by enforcement of popular morality as an end unto
itself and a presumption in favor of governmental regulation over individual liberty. See id. at 96.
See also HART, supra note I, at 77-81.
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Equal protection cases, however, are very different than due process
cases. Instead of being based on a communal standard, equal protection
claims are rooted in a counter-majoritarian philosophy that requires courts
to look past the existing morality and even past legislative intent to see
whether a constitutional violation has occurred. 130 " The emphasis in equal
protection analysis is on whether the law at issue consists of "invidious
discrimination," which, for many jurists, is defined by considerations other
than those drawn by the state.131 If this is true, then the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits animosity or hostility from providing a basis for law,
since such emotions are irrelevant to any legitimate legal classification. 132
Even though Romer clearly benefited from the more stringent equal
protection analysis that denies hostility or animus any role in the law, ju-
rists should think carefully about whether such emotions should be permit-
ted in the context of due process claims as well. As discussed above, some
judges and justices have indicated a willingness to permit moral disap-
proval to act as a justification for restrictive morality laws on at least some
level. However, it seems anomalous to permit these two lines of cases to
exist simultaneously. On the one hand, courts have decided that they will
not tolerate laws based on hostility toward a certain group because such
laws result in an inequitable legal treatment of persons who are similarly
situated in all pertinent respects. It seems strange therefore to argue that
hostility toward these persons is, at the same time, "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" and "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ... fundamental.' ' 133 Instead, it would make more sense if
courts struck those laws as inherently violative of fundamental constitu-
tional principles. 134 To do otherwise would be the same as constitutional-
130. See Welch, supra note 33, at 96 ("[S]imply enforcing the community's morality is not a
legitimate purpose for equal protection purposes."). See also id. at 92 (noting legislative intent is less
relevant to equal protection analysis). The differences between equal protection claims and due proc-
ess analyses can be seen in the recent Supreme Court decisions on physician-assisted suicide, Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), and Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). See also Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (comparing a due process and an equal protection analysis).
131. See Welch, supra note 33, at 92-93 (discussing Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1070-74 (1979)).
132. See id. at 94. See also Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 1001; supra note 78 (citing
cases supporting this theory).
133. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
134. Disallowing hostility toward a certain group to constitute a basis for law, even when that
hostility is shared by an overwhelming majority of the population, would also help harmonize the dis-
crepancy between equal protection and due process cases. Proponents of morality legislation might
argue that, if constitutional consistency were the only goal, it would be equally appropriate to amend
equal protection jurisprudence to conform to existing due process case law. However, as opponents of
substantive due process have often argued, it is better to rely on explicit constitutional language
whenever possible, and the Equal Protection Clause, as the more specific of the two provisions, should
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izing hatred, something the Founders surely never contemplated, and
something that, in any event, modem jurists should not tolerate.
To some extent, much of the confusion in this area of law has resulted
from the inherent and perennial problems associated with a common law
system. Although case-by-case analysis is a valuable component of the
Anglo-American legal system, it can be troublesome in that it offers little
time or opportunity to consider broader principles of law.135 Conflicts
may occur between lines of cases that were once distinct but that have,
over the years, become intertwined. Such is the case with due process and
equal protection jurisprudence. For example, there may be some due proc-
ess cases in which the act at issue is not "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,"'136 but where the law is enacted in order to enforce
popular animus or hostility toward a certain group or class of persons.
Under current law, a court would have to deny constitutional protection to
the affected persons because no right was conferred under a substantive
due process analysis that focused either on the historical status of the act in
question or on communal standards of behavior and belief.'37 Equal pro-
tection arguments will not necessarily protect such people, for a court that
is persuaded to permit hostility to constitute a legitimate basis for law un-
der a due process analysis is unlikely to find the burdened class similar to
control. See United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("[I]f the constitu-
tional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that
a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government in-
terest."). See also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its
impartiality would be suspect.").
135. In this regard, Scalia is to be commended for at least attempting to enunciate and implement
a larger theory of jurisprudence during his tenure on the bench. See Rosen, supra note 67, at 1725.
However, critics have argued that he sometimes places too much reliance on his interpretive principles
and too little emphasis on the case in front of him. See id. at 1726.
136. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
137. However, it is in those areas of the law where rights have traditionally not been recognized
that courts should be most cautious. As Justice Stevens noted:
the Court should be especially vigilant in examining any classification which involves [a
traditionally disfavored trait]. For a traditional classification is more likely to be used without
pausing to consider its justification than is a newly created classification. Habit, rather than
analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien
and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia
in distinguishing between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no
rational relationship-other than pure prejudicial discrimination-to the stated purpose for
which the classification is being made.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the unburdened class in all pertinent respects. 138 Yet it still seems wrong
to permit the state to act on the basis of hostility toward minorities.
The solution may be found in the underlying principles of due proc-
ess. Professor Henkin hypothesizes that due process of law "requires that
the state deal with the area of the reasonable and deal with it reasona-
bly."'139 Because morality and corruption of morals do not lie "in the
realm of reason," they "cannot be judged by standards of reasonable-
ness... [and] ought not, perhaps, to be in the domain of government."'140
Even if morality could be determined to be rational or reasonable, hostility
and animus cannot. 141 The American legal system is presumably built on
something more than mere likes and dislikes, 142 and thus laws based on
hostility should not stand under either a due process or an equal protection
analysis. If constitutional law is to retain some sense of coherence, these
two lines of cases should be somehow resolved. Because the existing
equal protection analysis offers the sounder approach, it should control. 143
B. ENFORCING MORALITY AT CIVIL, AS OPPOSED TO CRIMINAL, LAW
Scalia's other argument in Romer is that the state may regulate civilly
what it may penalize criminally. 144 Under this theory, Scalia believed that
Bowers v. Hardwick145 should have controlled the issue.at bar.146  In fact,
138. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1632-37 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding
no denial of equal protection of the laws despite the existence of animus as a basis for law in ques-
tion).
139. Henkin, supra note 5, at 406.
140. Id. at 407.
141. See Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 1001.
142. But cf. Dalton, supra note 4, at 904-05 (noting under certain jurisprudential philosophies,
the majority's response to minorities who claim they don't like certain aspects of majority morality is
that "we do"). Simple majoritarianism, while perhaps effective when backed by the power of the
state, lacks legitimacy in the eyes of both jurists and lay persons. See Gey, supra note 4, at 403;
Smith, supra note 7, at 327.
143. Although the state may not always act affirmatively to end discrimination based on hostility
toward disfavored groups, it can refuse to help perpetuate it. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) ("The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private bi-
ases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
See also Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 48, at 1001 (noting that prejudice is an illegitimate basis
for law in a democratic state).
144. "If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual
conduct." Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, it is more
likely that the converse is true: If an act may not be made the subject of the criminal law because it is
an illegitimate extension of the state's legislative powers into the realm of individual liberty, then the
state may not utilize its civil powers to address the same behavior.
145. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia would go so far as to allow the state to impose civil burdens even in
areas where it is no longer appropriate for the criminal law to act. To sup-
port this claim, Scalia states that "the society that eliminates criminal pun-
ishment for homosexual acts does not necessarily abandon the view that
homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful; often, abolition
simply reflects the view that enforcement of such criminal laws involves
unseemly intrusion into the intimate lives of citizens." 147
There are several problems with Scalia's argument, especially as he
has formulated it. First, there is no guarantee that the same sort of
"unseemly intrusions into the intimate lives of citizens" that were objec-
tionable at criminal law will not take place under civil provisions such as
Amendment 2; the mere fact that this intrusion will now be carried out by
private citizens rather than by public entities does not eliminate the impro-
priety of such intrusions. In fact, under Amendment 2, the state would still
be involved in these intrusions into citizens' personal lives whenever a de-
fendant justified a discriminatory act by alleging the plaintiff was homo-
sexual. 148 For example, in a case of wrongful termination, a plaintiff may
claim gender discrimination. The defendant would have a valid reason for
termination if it could prove the termination was based on the plaintiff's
homosexuality. In such a case, the court not only must witness such argu-
ments at trial, but must also assist the defendant during the pretrial pro-
ceedings by issuing subpoenas and forcing discovery into the plaintiffs
personal life to establish the presence or absence of homosexual orienta-
tion. Notably, under Scalia's approach, homosexual conduct is not neces-
sary, as homosexual orientation acts as a sufficient "stand-in" for homo-
147. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 99.
148. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) ("That the action of state courts and ofjudi-
cial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this
Court."). Although Shelley is best known as the case that prohibited judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants, it also acts as an equally powerful argument against morality legislation. See id.
at 22 ("The Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action by the State which
results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals."). In many ways, Shelley an-
ticipated the type of private discrimination that arose under Amendment 2, that is, permitting private
individuals to discriminate against homosexuals under color of law despite the fact that the trait at
issue had no impact on the individual's ability to perform a contract, lease, or job. Compare id. at 19
("Mhese are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive
power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property
rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors
are willing to sell."), with Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("We also conclude that sexual orientation, whether hetero-, homo-,
or bisexual, bears no relation whatsoever to an individual's ability to perform, or to participate in, or
contribute to, society.") (citations omitted), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct.
2519 (1996).
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sexual acts.149  In this regard, Scalia goes far beyond the scope of the
criminal law, which requires some sort of act in order to successfully
prosecute someone; instead, he would civilly burden people based on their
thoughts alone and would allow the courts to delve not only into people's
acts, but their most private and intimate personal feelings as well. If it is
improper for the state to be involved in obtaining evidence of homosexual
acts at criminal law, 150 it is equally improper for it to investigate homo-
sexual acts or orientation in the civil context.
Second, under Amendment 2 and similar provisions, homosexuality
could easily become a pretext for all sorts of discrimination. 5' This is
similar to the concern enunciated by the Romer majority that upholding
Amendment 2 would invalidate general protections against unfair or arbi-
trary discrimination. 152  In a society that permits legal discrimination
against homosexuals, gays and lesbians have no guarantee that their legally
recognized rights will or can be protected.
Third, provisions such as Amendment 2 risk creating the civil
equivalent of a status crime. As stated previously, Scalia would permit the
state of Colorado to impose civil burdens even on those who had per-
formed no immoral acts but who had merely admitted to being of homo-
sexual orientation. 153 Although Scalia attempts to minimize the size of the
class,' 54 the fact remains that there are a number of people who recognize
their homosexual orientation but, for religious or other reasons, choose to
remain celibate rather than engage in homosexual relations. Under
Amendment 2, these persons would be penalized not because they have
engaged in any prohibited behavior but because they are bearers of a dis-
favored personality trait. In fact, the only way for persons of homosexual
orientation to avoid being burdened under Amendment 2 is to change their
beliefs about their sexual orientation, despite the fact that virtually all
149. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To obtain evidence [in sodomy cases], police are
obliged to resort to behavior which tends to degrade and demean both themselves personally and law
enforcement as an institution.") (citation omitted).
151. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994) (noting gender and race are
overlapping qualities and that if a court permits peremptory strikes on basis of gender to stand,
"gender can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination").
152. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
153. See id. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 1631-33 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that persons of "homosexual orien-
tation" do not constitute a distinct class).
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modem jurists agree that coercion of belief is an illegitimate use of the
law. 155
There is an even greater problem with Scalia's premise that the civil
law may address any behavior that the criminal law addresses; namely, the
purposes, goals, and procedures of the criminal law are and should remain
distinct from those of the civil law. Criminal procedure has always been
different from civil procedure, based on the higher need for accuracy due
to the potential loss of liberty and the stigmatizing effect of a criminal
conviction. Nothing in Scalia's dissent directly threatens the distinction
between criminal and civil procedure; 56 instead, it is the distinction be-
tween the permissible goals and uses of the criminal and civil law that is
jeopardized by Scalia's analysis. Although some commentators perceive
few, if any, fundamental differences between the purposes of the civil and
criminal law, others believe not only that such differences exist, but that
they should remain.' 57 This latter group of persons argues that if the law is
to maintain any internal consistency, it cannot push onto the civil law the
duties and goals of the criminal law without the concomitant procedural
protections given to a criminal defendant. 1
58
There are numerous ways to explain or identify the differences be-
tween the purposes of the civil and criminal law.'59 Although both types
155. The other alternative is for them to lie about their orientation, something that is equally dis-
favored. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) ("It is also to be
noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that pupils forego any contrary convictions
of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be accept-
able if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning.").
156. But see infra note 159.
157. See John C. Coffee, Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1875-76 (1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1807-09 (1992).
There are instances, of course, where both civil and criminal sanctions are imposed against a party, but
that does not necessarily mean that such combined sanctions are appropriate in all circumstances or
that the civil law may replace the criminal law.
158. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1345, 1355, 1360 (1991); Coffee, supra note 157, at 1877.
159. Scholarly literature on this subject identifies five factors that distinguish criminal law from
civil law:
(1) the greater role of intent in the criminal law, with its emphasis on subjective awareness
rather than objective reasonableness; (2) the criminal law's focus on risk creation, rather than
actual harm; (3) its insistence on greater evidentiary certainty and its lesser tolerance for pro-
cedural informality; (4) its reliance on public enforcement, tempered by prosecutorial discre-
tion; and (5) its deliberate intent to inflict punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma and
censure.
Coffee, supra note 157, at 1878 (emphasis added). Under this formulation, Amendment 2 resembles
the criminal law more than it does the civil law, since it intends to stigmatize homosexuals by demon-
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of laws intend to deter certain behavior, the goals and methods used to ac-
complish that end are different.160 Some theorists emphasize the ability of
the criminal law to "focus censure and assign blame" with a "moral force"
that is unavailable in civil law, while others point to the criminal law's
serving as a means of "moral education."' 161 In addition, the criminal law
strating that the state considers homosexuals undeserving of any protection at law, despite the fact that
antihomosexual discrimination does, in fact, occur. In the case of celibate homosexuals, the stigma
attaches on the basis of a mere belief lacking any sort of overt act.
Sociologist Emile Durkheim, who identified two types of bonds'in a society (that is, mechanical
solidarity, which emphasizes the common elements between persons, and organic solidarity, which
emphasizes complementary characteristics), believed that "[tihe criminal law, with its repressive
sanctions, reflects mechanical solidarity; the civil law reflects organic solidarity, since it upholds the
typical instruments of interdependence, e.g., the institution of contract, and generally provides not for
repressive sanctions, but for restitution and compensation." H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the
Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. Cmt. L. REV. 1, 6 (1967) [hereinafter Hart, Social Solidarity]. Durk-
heim also noted that the need for a high degree of mechanical solidarity decreases as a society be-
comes more complex. See id. Amendment 2, which seems to reflect mechanical solidarity in that it
encourages social conformity through the use of repressive sanctions, seems to be more of a criminal
than civil law.
The factors identified by scholars are similar to those enunciated by the Supreme Court in de-
termining whether, for constitutional purposes, a punishment is criminal or civil. In order to discover
whether a sanction is criminal or civil, the Supreme Court looks at
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has histori-
cally been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears ex-
cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ....
Kennedy v. Mendoz-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (emphasis added). See also Cheh, supra
note 158, at 1357-58. This analysis also suggests that Amendment 2 is more criminal than civil in its
orientation. This conclusion is borne out by Scalia's statement that Amendment 2 is intended to deter
homosexual behavior (and possibly homosexual orientation) in order to "preserve" Coloradans' tradi-
tional sexual morality. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under this formulation,
if homosexuals do not change their beliefs about their sexuality (since merely changing their behavior
would still permit others to discriminate against them as persons of homosexual orientation), then the
community may pass moral judgment on them, in both a social and a legal sense, and may permit pri-
vate individuals to dispense retribution in the form of legally condoned discrimination. Thus, under
both a scholarly and a constitutional analysis, Amendment 2, like many other morality laws that stig-
matize and punish immoral behavior, is more akin to criminal law than civil law.
160. See Coffee, supra note 157, at 1876, 1884-85. See also Cheh, supra note 158, at 1332-33
(identifying ways in which civil remedies complement the criminal law objectives of preventing crime
and finding and punishing offenders); id. at 1355 n.166 (describing different types of deterrence).
Commentators agree that not all disfavored acts should be criminalized. For example, "to maintain its
moral force, the criminal law should address only seriously antisocial behavior and only behavior in-
volving persons who are responsible for their actions." Id. at 1346.
161. Coffee, supra note 157, at 1876. Some jurists have argued that the use of the criminal law
reflects and shapes public perception of the severity of an offense and that, as a rule, the only acts that
are criminalized are those that are considered more culpable than those that are civilly actionable. See
id. at 1889. See also Cheh, supra note 158, at 1352 (noting criminal law's emphasis on "judgment of
community condemnation"); Reinig, supra note 28, at 898 (noting legitimization of "gay bashing"
due to legally imposed stigma). Apparently, it is this perceived ability of the law to shape public per-
ception that Scalia is relying on when he says that the law is capable of "preserving" traditional sexual
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assigns costs or sanctions to different behaviors that are "intended to dis-
suade the actor from engaging in the activity at all."'162 Essentially, the
criminal law's purpose is to eliminate completely those behaviors that it
considers lacking in social utility. 163
The civil law, on the other hand, does not intend to completely elimi-
nate certain behaviors but merely requires "the actor to internalize costs
that the actor's conduct imposes on others.' ' 164 Because the civil law at-
tempts to redress costs imposed on others by the actor,165 civil defendants
can choose whether to take the proper precautions and avoid these costs
altogether, or to pay the requisite price to victims after the fact.166 Little
moral blame (if any) is attached to breaches of the civil law, especially
since violations can occur through mere negligence or impaired action.167
The cost that is subsequently imposed on the offending party is often
monetary, but it may take other forms, such as the loss of government
benefits or privileges, as was the case with Amendment 2.168 Some have
morality. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, laws that have as their sole
purpose the shaping of citizens' beliefs about the morality or immorality of a certain behavior are dis-
favored in American jurisprudence since they aim to coerce belief.
162. Coffee, supra note 157, at 1876. Some theorists claim that "[t]he decision that the benefits
derived by the defendant are so perverse, immoral, or otherwise unacceptable as to be wholly disre-
garded by society (and thus 'prohibited' by a total deterrence policy) should require a greater commu-
nal consensus than a judicial or ajury decision represents" and should thus be made part of the crimi-
nal law, which is created primarily through legislation. Id. at 1884. This approach is reminiscent of
Devlin's and Scalia's theory (i) that the legislature is the proper, or at least primary, means of enforc-
ing popular morality and (ii) that morality legislation may be enacted according to majority wishes.
163. See Cheh, supra note 158, at 1352; Coffee, supra note 157, at 1876. For some people, the
only appropriate grounds for punishment are "violations of minimal moral standards of decency re-
specting individual rights to integrity, security, and justice." David AJ. Richards, Punishment, Dan-
ger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 242 (1982) (book review).
164. Coffee, supra note 157, at 1876. This definition seems most appropriate in the context of
tort or administrative actions, see id. at 1878, and does not seem to apply to laws such as Amendment
2. It is hard to identify any harm that homosexuals are doing to others that Amendment 2 is intended
to cure; instead, Amendment 2 seems more akin to criminal provisions that intend to burden homo-
sexuality to the point that it disappears or that intend to educate society about the alleged immorality
of homosexuality.
165. See id. at 1882-83.
166. See id. at 1883. However, recompense does not seem to be the goal of laws such as
Amendment 2; instead, such laws allegedly intend to preserve and protect certain social mores, which
seems to be more of a purpose of the criminal law.
167. See Cheh, supra note 158, at 1336, 1346.
168. See id. at 1333 (discussing types of civil remedies available); id. at 1337-38 (discussing loss
of government benefits and privileges). In a modem welfare state, people are highly dependent on
government benefits and privileges, such as monetary awards, services, contracts, and licenses. See
id. at 1331 & n.27 (describing scope of modem welfare state). Therefore, by permitting not just pri-
vate actors but state actors to discriminate against homosexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation
and by denying homosexuals the right to cure that problem through antidiscrimination legislation at
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described the civil law as setting forth "aspirational" goals while the
criminal law creates behavioral minimums. 169
In attempting to identify whether a provision is criminal or civil,
some commentators have advocated a pragmatic approach that is based on
the intended effect of the law. 170 If the law attempts to deprive the defen-
dant of any and all benefits derived from the act, then the law is more
likely criminal than civil in nature. 171 If the law merely attempts to reduce
the occurrence of a certain behavior, the law is more likely civil. 172 In
addition, the level and amount of departures from society's behavioral
norms will influence whether civil or criminal law is and should be util-
ized. 173
In Romer, Scalia assumed that the civil law may be used to invoke or
reflect society's disapproval of homosexuality. However, "[o]ne distinc-
tion between criminal and civil sanctions.. . lies in the criminal law's
'judgment of community condemnation' on a transgressor. For some
commentators, therefore, the ultimate difference between civil and crimi-
nal proceedings is that a criminal conviction, unlike civil judgment, carries
with it the stigma, or brand, of societal condemnation."' 174  Although
Amendment 2 did not contemplate a judicial process requiring a determi-
nation that approximated a criminal conviction, 175 its intent was to stigma-
the local level, the proponents of Amendment 2 wielded a very powerful coercive tool against homo-
sexual behavior.
169. See Coffee, supra note 157, at 1879. Lon Fuller would disagree with that analysis, since he
identified the morality of aspiration not with legal duties but with legally unenforceable moral stan-
dards. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 5-15.
170. See Coffee, supra note 157, at 1885.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1886.
173. See id. at 1886-87. The criminal law demands that a precise standard of behavior be identi-
fied and incorporates a societal desire to tolerate few departures from that standard. See id. The civil
law, on the other hand, permits more and greater departures from the legally established behavioral
norm and often creates a less-stringently defined standard in the first place. See id.
174. Cheh, supra note 158, at 1352 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,404 (1958)).
175. This, in itself, was arguably a constitutional violation. See United States v. Briggs, 514
F.2d 794, 806 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding, in a case where a grand jury named defendants as criminals
but did not indict them, that "[t]here is at least a strong suspicion that the stigmatization of appellants
was part of an overall governmental tactic directed against disfavored persons and groups, Visiting
opprobrium on persons by officially charging them with crimes while denying them a forum to vindi-
cate their names, undertaken as an extra-judicial punishment or to chill their expression and associa-
tions, is not a governmental interest that we can accept or consider"). Though not creating a criminal
assumption, by permitting state and private actors to discriminate against homosexuals at will,
Amendment 2 did deny homosexuals the right to clear their names of the negative stereotypes associ-
ated with homosexuality and, even more importantly, with the stigma associated with being denied
state protection from discrimination. In addition, Amendment 2 chilled freedom of association, since
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tize and condemn homosexuality. 176 Although this is an inappropriate use
of the civil law in the first place, it is even more egregious in light of the
absence of any individualized determination that the burdened individual
deserves the opprobrium of society; Amendment 2, as a legislative device
barring any suits stemming from discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion or practices, effectively foreclosed any opportunity for individualized
due process, something that is critically important in the criminal system's
aim of allocating moral blame.177 In fact, the sort of social condemnation
that Scalia would permit in Romer is commonly believed to be within the
exclusive power of the criminal law.
17 8
Those who support the use of the criminal law to enforce popular mo-
rality defend their position by citing two well-known theoretical bases for
it created an atmosphere in which people would be afraid to meet publicly to lobby for political
change because they would feel that by doing so they were marking themselves as targets for dis-
crimination. See Reinig, supra note 28, at 888 (noting how gays and lesbians are limited politically in
a society where they are stigmatized). See also Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting homosexuals, "while not a wholly politi-
cally powerless group, do suffer significant political impediments"), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996); Gay Law Students Assoc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d
592, 610-11 (Cal. 1979) (striking company policy of firing homosexuals as violative of California's
labor code, which prohibited employers from limiting employees' participation in politics; holding
that if homosexuals are to have political rights, they must be permitted to be open about their sexuality
without fear of retribution by employers).
176. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But the society
that eliminates criminal punishment for homosexual acts does not necessarily abandon the view that
homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful....").
177. See Cheh, supra note 158, at 1353 ("The very act of labeling certain behavior as criminal
clearly reflects the community's moral judgment that it is deviant, unacceptable, and, therefore, to be
officially and publicly condemned. By affixing this label, society binds itself to the stringent proce-
dures applicable to criminal proceedings; it does so both to protect individual rights and to give its
final judgment much more certainty, power, and finality."). In Romer, Scalia would permit the com-
munity to cast a moral judgment that certain behavior is "deviant, unacceptable, and.., publicly con-
demned" without allowing the individuals affected by such laws to defend themselves from either the
tangible burdens or the moral condemnation placed upon them in any way short of amending the state
constitution. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. See Cheh, supra note 158, at 1355. In some nominally civil cases, "the punishment im-
posed so dramatically expresses societal disapproval that its imposition only can be legitimated
through the ceremony of a criminal conviction .... Included in this category of punishments are... a
kind of banishment that represents the ultimate separation from society." Id. at 1363. Some would
argue that there is no banishment more severe than a legal determination that others may discriminate
against people on the basis of a characteristic that is totally unrelated to their ability to act as a con-
tributing member of society. In addition, the withdrawing from a particular group the ability to effec-
tuate political change at the local, state, or national level can also be considered a type of banishment.
See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (noting that in order to create society in which mo-
nogamy is the only legal sexual union, "no means are more directly and immediately suitable than
those provided by this act, which endeavors to withdraw all political influence from those who are
practically hostile to its attainment").
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the criminal law: retribution and denunciation. However, neither justifica-
tion is applicable to the civil law.
For example, in defending morality laws in Victorian England, James
Fitzjames Stephen relied on a simple "form of retributive theory: that
punishment of the criminal is justified because 'the feeling of hatred and
the desire of vengeance are important elements in human nature which
ought in such cases to be satisfied in a regular public and legal man-
ner.' 179 One hundred years later, Devlin condoned this approach, based
on his assumption that society has a common morality and is deeply af-
fronted by any deviation therefrom. 8 ' However, retribution, while an ar-
guably valid goal for the criminal law, is not an appropriate end for the
civil law.
One reason why the civil law has not and should not be used as a re-
tributive tool is because criminal penalties should not be imposed unless
an individual has committed some sort of crime18' and has been proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'82 Generally, society hesitates to im-
pose retribution in the absence of some higher guarantee of culpability
than a mere preponderance of the evidence. However, the type of civil
retribution imposed by Amendment 2 can exist without any sort of trial
establishing a level of guilt or culpability; individual employers and land-
lords, for example, are permitted to dispense society's retribution at will,
possibly based on nothing more than patently inadmissible hearsay and
hunches.
179. HART, supra note 1, at 61 (quoting Stephen). However, there is little, if any, need for retri-
bution in victimless crimes. See FEINBERG, supra note 7, at 158-65.
180. See DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 17. See also HART, supra note 1, at 62. Durkheim also sup-
ported this general concept, in that he believed that punishment of those who violate social norms was
necessary in order to give symbolic expression to the outraged common morality. See Hart, Social
Solidarity, supra note 159, at 7. According to Durkheim, punishment is required not to repress the
immoral conduct but to sustain common morality by giving vent to the community's sense of outrage;
if the vent were closed, the communal "conscience" would "lose its energy" and the morality which
acted as a cohesive element in society would be weakened. See id. at 8. In this regard, Durkheim's
justification for morality legislation is similar to Devlin's disintegration thesis.
181. Devlin would argue that immorality is a crime against society, in that society will disinte-
grate under the weight of unchecked immorality. See DEVLIN, supra note 2, at 10, 13. However, if
society intends to adopt that theory of harm, it should use the criminal law to address it, for reasons
that shall be discussed infra. In addition, provisions such as Amendment 2 impose burdens even in
the absence of an overt act, something which is prohibited in Anglo-American criminal law. But see
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (permitting homosexual orientation alone to be
burdened).
182. Some commentators have argued that the increased use of the civil law to address what are
essentially criminal problems may be an indirect but highly effective method of avoiding the higher
standard of proof and more rigorous procedural burdens of the criminal law. See Cheh, supra note
158, at 1345, 1355, 1360; Coffee, supra note 157, at 1877.
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Even if retribution were considered to be an appropriate aim of the
civil law, Amendment 2 and similar provisions suffer from a failure to dis-
pense retribution equally among like members of society, despite the legal
requirement that similarly situated persons are to be treated in a similar
manner.183 It is clear that not all homosexuals would be treated equally
under laws such as Amendment 2: Those who lived in liberal communities
would experience little or no social retribution, while those who lived in
more conservative communities would find discrimination much more
common. In such circumstances, the retributive power of Amendment 2 is
diminished, if not eliminated, as it becomes apparent that social condem-
nation of homosexuality is not universal but is limited to a small but vocal
segment of the population. When viewed in this light, Amendment 2 looks
less like a form of universal social retribution than permission for certain
individuals to legally vent their spleen. The only way to correct this error
so that societal retribution is distributed in a more evenhanded manner
would be to make discrimination against homosexuals mandatory, some-
thing that even Scalia cannot in good conscience advocate.
184
The second justification used by commentators to support the use of
the criminal law to enforce popular morality is denunciation.' 85 The idea
here is to "ratify" the morality that has been violated by giving voice to the
"hatred which is excited by the commission of the offence."'186 Scalia ap-
183. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Hart, Positivism, supra note 7, at 624.
But cf. Felice v. Rhode Island Bd of Elections, 781 F. Supp. 100, 106 (D.R.I. 1991) (noting that per-
fection in the administration of laws is a goal, but lack of perfect administration is not necessarily a
violation of the Constitution; but also noting that a selective enforcement claim will stand if a person
is treated differently from other similarly situated persons and such selective treatment is based on
"malicious bad faith intent to injure the claimant").
184. Interestingly, one of the arguments used to combat the attempt by some liberals to create a
morally neutral political climate is that removing morality from the law will create a horrific, amoral
legal system similar to that of Nazi Germany. See Dworkin, Community, supra note 4, at 497. See
also Hart, Positivism, supra note 7, at 616-21 (discussing similar conclusions made by German jurists
who lived through the Nazi regime). However, the evolution of the Nazi totalitarian state is equally
consistent with attempts by a hostile majority to transform the law into a tool for abusing politically
powerless groups. For example, in pre-World War II Germany, shopkeepers and landlords were first
permitted to discriminate against Jews (and, it should be noted, homosexuals and other disfavored
groups), with mandatory discrimination and the genocidal "Final Solution" eventually following. See
also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) ("Struggles to coerce uni-
formity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country have been
waged by many good as well as by evil men .... As first and moderate methods to attain unity have
failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As governmental
pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.").
185. See HART, supra note 1, at 63.
186. Id. at 64 (quoting Stephen).
19971
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parently approved of this approach, in that he described using the law, both
civil and criminal, to signify "moral disapproval" of homosexuality. 18 7
All of the arguments used to oppose the civil law's adoption of retri-
bution as a justification for morality laws also apply to denunciation. For
example, the lack of an overt act, the lower standard of proof, and the in-
equitable and inconsistent application of provisions such as Amendment 2
all suggest that the civil law should not be used as a means of denuncia-
tion. As Hart stated, "[tlhe idea that we may punish offenders against a
moral code, not to prevent harm or suffering or even the repetition of the
offence but simply as a means of venting or emphatically expressing moral
condemnation, is uncomfortably close to human sacrifice as an expression
of religious worship."'188 Even if it were appropriate for society to express
its moral condemnation of homosexuality by the imposition of certain civil
or criminal laws, 189 Amendment 2 and similar provisions operate far more
as legalized gay-bashing at the hands of discrete individuals than they do
as a universal societal judgment on the morality of homosexuality.
Nevertheless, advocates of denunciation view it as "effective in in-
stilling or strengthening in the offender and in others respect for the moral
code which has been violated," 190 a goal that, if attainable, would seem to
apply equally to the civil and criminal law. However, it has not been
proven that criminalizing (or burdening at civil law) certain actions leads
the population to think of those actions as immoral (as opposed to merely
illegal), for there are many instances where something is known to be ille-
gal but is not necessarily considered immoral. Use of marijuana, for ex-
ample, is illegal but is not universally considered immoral. Conversely,
some people consider miscegenation immoral, although it is not illegal. 191
Therefore, it is misleading to argue that morality and legality always are or
always should be linked. 192
The punitive aspect of the law is not the only reason why commenta-
tors oppose morality legislation becoming a routine part of the civil law.
187. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1632-33 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. HART, supra note 1, at 66.
189. Notably, states cannot pass laws merely to reflect moral condemnation while simultane-
ously intending never to enforce those laws since such actions make a mockery of the law at issue as
well as the legal system as a whole. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 153.
190. HART, supra note 1, at 66.
191. See WALTER H. CAPPS, THE NEw RELIGIOUS RIGHT: PIETY, PATRIOTISM, AND POLITICS
102-04 (1990). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 n.5 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
192. See Cheh, supra note 158, at 134446 (noting instances in which the public merely wants to
deter certain acts but does not intend to make a moral statement).
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Hart believed that the coercive effect such laws have on those who may
never actually break the laws was an evil unto itself, regardless of whether
the law was civil or criminal.' 93
[W]here there is no harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be
protected, as is often the case where conventional sexual morality is dis-
regarded, it is difficult to understand the assertion that conformity, even
if motivated merely by fear of the law's punishment, is a value worth
pursuing .... 194
Nevertheless, Scalia's attempt to equate civil and criminal law is
consistent with modem trends to collapse the differences between civil and
criminal law. 195 Although courts have often used civil remedies to address
criminal acts, 196 various courts, including the Supreme Court, have begun
to blur the lines between civil and criminal punishment by increasing the
number of situations in which civil remedies are used to address quasi-
criminal problems. 197 One of the areas which has been most prone to this
jurisprudential shift is administrative law, which was once Scalia's spe-
cialty. 198 However, what is arguably appropriate in an administrative law
setting is not necessarily appropriate vis-h.-vis morality, where there is no
reason to presume that the policymaker is always correct. 199
193. See HART, supra note 1, at 21 ("The unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice may
be held a value in itself with which it is primafacie wrong to interfere .....
194. Id. at 57.
195. See Cheh, supra note 158, at 1325 (noting that division between the two types of law has
existed for centuries).
196. See id. at 1327. For example, a thief might simultaneously face a criminal prosecution
brought on by the state and a civil action brought on by the victim for recompense. See id.
197. See Coffee, supra note 157, at 1892.
198. See id. at 1887-88 (noting collapsing of civil and criminal law in regulatory and adminis-
trative law contexts); Rosen, supra note 67, at 1716. Some of Scalia's interpretive idiosyncrasies,
including this tendency to treat criminal and civil law as interchangeable, might be traced to his back-
ground in administrative law. For example, administrative agencies are often criticized as being
"arbitrary, capricious, and irresponsible in their ad hoc policy making, enforcement, and decisional
processes." 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 63 § 17.3, at 106-07 (noting widespread inconsistencies in
decisions of federal courts reviewing agency actions and Supreme Court's move to reduce discretion
of reviewing courts); I JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw § 1.01[2], at 1-16 (1996). This has led many administrative law scholars to focus on determining
"methods of controlling and checking the exercise of discretionary powers to avoid their abuse." 2
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 63, at xvi. Scalia's insistence on following a rigid interpretive model
could very well be a backlash against this less rule-bound system. See Rosen, supra note 67, at 1715.
Administrative courts are also highly deferential to congressional delegations of power, which again
might explain Scalia's preference for deferring to legislative will. See I STEIN ET AL., supra,
§ 3.03[l], at 3-77 (discussing judiciary's almost uniform record for sustaining broad delegations of
power to administrative agencies); id. § 3.03[5], at 3-109 (same).
199. See Coffee, supra note 157, at 1878, 1882 (noting importance of extemal costs to others in
context of tort and regulatory law).
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Alternatively, Scalia's statement that those behaviors that may be ad-
dressed by the criminal law may also be addressed by the civil law may
mean that he considers burdens at civil law to be a type of "lesser included
offence" to penalties imposed by the criminal law.2"' This position is
similar to that of those who believe that the gradation of legal punishment,
which is arguably based on differing levels of moral culpability,2 0' dem-
onstrates the permissibility of legal enforcement of morality.202 However,
gradation of crime can also be explained on the basis of differences in ac-
tual or potential harm to others20 3 or on the grounds that correlating pun-
ishment to the popularly accepted degree of moral guilt serves the utilitar-
ian purpose of supporting respect for the law in the minds of the people.2°4
Ultimately, Hart argued that even if "in the course of punishing only harm-
ful activities we think it right.., to mark moral differences between dif-
ferent offenders, this does not show that we must also think it right to
punish activities which are not harmful.
205
V. CONCLUSION
In many ways, Amendment 2, the law at issue in Romer v. Evans, is a
typical piece of morality legislation, in that its intended purpose is to up-
hold or preserve one sort of moral code at the expense of a competing mo-
rality. However, in defending the alleged right of the majority to civilly
burden or otherwise penalize any minority group it happens to dislike,
Scalia has exceeded the bounds of jurisprudential propriety. Even accept-
ing arguendo the need for and legitimacy of morality legislation in general
(a premise that is not universally recognized), Scalia's assertion that ani-
mus toward disfavored groups can act as a permissible basis for law is not
only contrary to established constitutional principles but to a number of
200. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620,1631-32 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. See HART, supra note 1, at 34-38 (discussing Stephen's theories). Stephen argues that the
legal gradation of crimes demonstrated differing moral culpabilities, since if the law based its sentenc-
ing determinations solely on the issue of harm to others, the punishment in some cases (such as man-
slaughter and first-degree murder) would be the same since the outcome (death) was the same. See id.
at 35.
202. See id. at 36-37 (noting Stephen's conclusion that gradation of crimes "showed that the ob-
ject of such punishment was not merely to prevent acts 'dangerous to society' but 'to be a persecution
of the grosser forms of vice"').
203. See id. at 36-38. For instance, in the example cited supra note 201, the different sentence
gradations could be based on potential harm to others, in that society faces a greater danger from a
cold-blooded, premeditated killer (first-degree murder) than from a negligent killer (involuntary man-
slaughter). See Coffee, supra note 157, at 1878 (noting "criminal law's focus on risk creation, rather
than actual harm").
204. See HART, supra note I, at 37.
205. Id. at 38.
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jurisprudential norms. According to the rule of law, a nation must identify
rational, dispassionate, and externally justifiable reasons for its laws if it is
to hold the trust and respect of its citizens; since mere dislike of a certain
group is neither rational nor dispassionate, it cannot provide a basis for
law. 206
Nor can the civil law act as an appropriate stand-in for the criminal
law in the area of morality legislation. Typically, to the extent that the law
has been used to make moral statements about certain behavior, it has done
so through the criminal rather than the civil system. Tradition aside, many
consider the civil law to be an inappropriate vehicle for morality legisla-
tion based on the absence of any social stigma associated with the viola-
tion of the civil law and the concomitant lack of procedural protections for
those accused of breaking the civil law. Although some may applaud the
circumvention of certain procedural protections for burdened individuals,
it is a jurisprudentially questionable shift in the law, and one which is nei-
ther necessary nor desirable. If society wishes to assert its moral condem-
nation of a certain act, it can more appropriately do so through the criminal
law in order to guarantee that only those who are deserving of societal dis-
approbation are affected. The haphazard application of Amendment 2 and
the lack of universal condemnation of the act in question are prime exam-
ples of why the civil law should not be used as a vehicle for imposing so-
cial stigma and condemnation.
Certainly there are arguments to be made in support of Scalia's posi-
tion in Romer, with the most notable being that the state has traditionally
been permitted to safeguard the health, safety, and morals of its citizens.
20 7
Such precedents, however, are neither so numerous nor so theoretically
justifiable as to require courts or legislatures to adopt Scalia's reasoning.
Indeed, six Justices believed there was sufficient precedent against Scalia.
206. As Hart noted, the greatest danger of democracy is not the mere oppression of a minority by
the majority but the belief that such an action "might come to be thought unobjectionable." Id. at
77-78.
207. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also Henkin, supra note 5, at 413 ("It asks
much of the Supreme Court to tell legislators, and communal groups behind them, that what has long
been deemed the law's business is no longer, that even large majorities or a 'general consensus' can-
not have their morality written into official law. And a reluctant Court can find support in history, and
some among the philosophers."). But cf id. at 414 (noting that at that time (1963), Supreme Court
had not yet held that popular morality could be enforced by law). However, regardless of whether
case law supports legislation of morality, there has been no indication that animus or hostility consti-
tutes a permissible basis for law in the United States, aside from a handful of nonbinding opinions
authored by Scalia and Bork. In addition, the fact that most commentators condemn the use of animus
as a basis for law suggests it is unsound as a matter of legal theory.
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Although some people might dismiss Scalia's dissent in Romer as a
mere minority opinion in a discrete, fact-specific area of law, it should not
be treated lightly. Scalia's basic premise, that hostility toward a minority
group constitutes a legitimate basis for law, could be used to justify re-
strictive civil laws against other unpopular groups. The fact that the harm-
ful language appears in a dissent offers little consolation, since dissents
often constitute the first step in a novel shift in the law. Romer v. Evans
has given U.S. jurists the unique opportunity of being able to choose
whether morality legislation should continue, and on what bases-let us
hope that liberty, rather than hostility, will prevail.
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